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BORDER VIOLENCE AS CRIME 
ITAMAR MANN* 
ABSTRACT  
As the violence of borders has increased since the beginning of 
the century, advocates have started to employ the language of anti-
impunity.  This discourse aims to frame border violence as a crime, 
often as a mass atrocity.  This Article is the first to identify and 
critically assess this type of response.  It offers a comparative multi-
regional analysis to analyze the turn to criminal law as it has figured 
in attempts to enforce the rights of refugees and migrants.  After 
defining the anti-impunity project, the Article analyzes anti-
impunity in the context of migration to Australia, Europe, and the 
United States.  It then proceeds to evaluate this trend in light of 
recent literature, which has been critical of anti-impunity and “the 
turn to criminal law” in human rights.   Critics of anti-impunity have 
argued, in the context of a broad range of human rights campaigns, 
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that the criminal law vocabulary diverts attention from underlying 
structural issues, including economic inequality.  This Article 
presents a defense of the criminal law framing of border violence, as 
one instrument within a broader toolbox of strategic litigation, and 
of transformative political action.  I argue the atrocity framing, 
common to contemporary progressive movements around the 
world, is an attempt to employ criminal law to counter violence 
rooted in global inequality. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 9, 2018, Ben Ferencz, the last surviving prosecutor at 
the Nuremberg trials, opined that Donald Trump committed “a 
crime against humanity” against migrants and refugees.1  Neither 
the 99-year-old lawyer nor the former President of the United States 
are alone in their respective roles as the accuser and the accused.  
Around the world, advocates have increasingly appealed to 
criminal law, including international criminal law, to establish 
liability for border violence.  Protest movements and progressive 
politicians have stressed analogies between contemporary abuses 
against migrants and historical mass atrocities—including, but not 
limited to, concentration camps.  As politicians in many developed 
countries introduce cruel measures against migrants, activists have 
turned towards criminal law and a discourse of anti-impunity. 2  
Celebrities have echoed this discourse on Twitter.3 
As a legal program, anti-impunity holds that a central 
mechanism of ensuring accountability for gross violations of human 
rights is criminal law.4  If domestic institutions fail to hold violators 
accountable, an international body should proceed, instead.  
Scholars identified a turn to criminal law in human rights in the 
 
 1 Mythili Sampathkumar, Last Surviving Prosecutor at Nuremberg Trials Says 




 2 On anti-impunity generally, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity for 
International Crimes, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 421 (2000); Payam Akhavan, Beyond 
Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities, 95 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 7, 16 (2001).  In the context of migration, see, for example, ANA GONZÁLEZ-
PÁRAMO, THE WIDESPREAD IMPUNITY OVER MIGRANT DEATHS (2017), 
http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-321-migrant-deaths-impunity.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NLN4-W78A]; Ryan Goodman (@rgoodlaw), TWITTER (June 22, 
2019, 6:54 PM), https://twitter.com/rgoodlaw/status/1142566649465397250 
[https://perma.cc/MQS2-JJYB]. 
 3 See e.g., Marissa J. Lang (@Marissa_Jae), TWITTER (July 16, 2019, 11:46 AM), 
https://twitter.com/Marissa_Jae/status/1151234786217857028; Andrea Pitzer 
(@andreapitzer), TWITTER (June 25, 2019, 5:07 PM), 
https://twitter.com/andreapitzer/status/1143626892660097026/photo/1 
[https://perma.cc/6G3A-PZDR].  
 4 See Karen Engle, Anti-Impunity and the Turn to Criminal Law in Human Rights, 
100 CORNELL L. REV. 1069, 1077-78 (2015) (explaining the reasons why early anti-
impunity advocates looked to “individual criminal responsibility” to hold human 
rights abusers accountable). 
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1990s, and criminal law has since become central to human rights.5  
Yet anti-impunity goes beyond a set of legal agendas.  It also refers 
to rhetoric in which gross human rights violations are analogized to 
past atrocities.  The turn to criminal law is part of a discourse on 
mass atrocity, characteristically grounded in the context of war and 
authoritarianism, and often advanced under the banner “never 
again.”6 
This Article offers a comparative multi-regional analysis to 
assess the turn to criminal law and to anti-impunity as it has figured 
in attempts to enforce the rights of refugees and migrants.  Karen 
Engle has advanced the critique of anti-impunity in an article titled 
Anti-Impunity and the Turn to Criminal Law in Human Rights. 7  
Alongside her co-editors Zinaida Miller and D.M. Davis, she has 
also collected critiques of this turn in an illuminating edited volume, 
Anti-Impunity and the Human Rights Agenda.8  This Article engages 
the critiques of anti-impunity primarily through a consideration of 
these sources.  Among the various contributions to the latter 
collection, I especially spend argumentative energy pushing back 
against Samuel Moyn’s essay Anti-Impunity as Deflection of 
Argument.9  I believe he raises an important philosophical challenge; 
one that is ultimately misguided. 
As the turn to criminal law in the protection of refugees and 
migrants is still rather inchoate, the scholars involved in this critique 
typically do not address refugees and migration.10  At the same time, 
this area of human rights has become one of the most divisive in 
public opinion in developed countries.11   This Article, therefore, 
 
 5 Id.  
 6  For a description of the rhetorical role of this phrase, see, for example, 
Michelle D. Bonner, ‘Never Again’: Transitional Justice and Persistent Police Violence in 
Argentina, 8 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 235 passim (2014); Charles Davison, Special 
Report, Never Again!!, 26 LAWNOW 32, 35 (2001); Karinne Coombes, Universal 
Jurisdiction: A Means to End Impunity or a Threat to Friendly International Relations?, 
43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 419, 420 (2011). 
 7 Engle, supra note 4. 
 8  ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA (Karen Engle, Zinaida 
Miller & D.M. Davis eds., 2016).  
 9 Samuel Moyn, Anti-Impunity as Deflection of Argument, in ANTI-IMPUNITY AND 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA, supra note 8, at 68, 68. 
 10 An exception to this, discussed below, is Janie Chuang’s important critique 
of criminalization in the context of trafficking.  See Janie A. Chuang, Exploitation 
Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 609 passim (2014). 
 11  See, e.g., Anthony Heath et al., Contested Terrain: Explaining Divergent 
Patterns of Public Opinion Towards Immigration within Europe, 46 J. ETHNIC & 
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seeks to determine to what extent the critique the literature raises is 
applicable to the burgeoning anti-impunity discourse on migrants 
and refugees.  As I have been involved in several of the initiatives 
described below, I do not argue from a purely academic perspective. 
My perspective is one of engaged academic and lawyer. 
Part II briefly explains what anti-impunity is.  Part III identifies 
the emergence of what I call the new anti-impunity.  I describe how 
the discourse appeared in refugee and migration policy 
conversations in three regional contexts:  Australia, the external 
borders of the EU, and the United States.  Part IV summarizes a set 
of critiques scholars have raised in recent years against the human 
rights movement’s turn to anti-impunity.  As advocates, should we 
extend anti-impunity discourse toward migrant and refugee 
struggles?   Or should the critique—originally directed at perceived 
shortcomings of anti-impunity in responding to war crimes and 
authoritarianism—serve as a warning against anti-impunity’s 
futility or adverse consequences?  While highlighting the value of 
the critique, I offer a qualified defense for strategies grounded in 
anti-impunity.  Part V concludes by providing an assessment of the 
merits, as well as the potential pitfalls, of the turn to criminal law in 
struggles for refugee and migrant rights. 
II. WHAT IS ANTI-IMPUNITY? 
The Rome Statute came into force in 2002 and established the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”). 12   The Statute’s preamble 
declares the aspirations that motivated its drafting process:  “that 
the most serious crimes of concern to the international community 
as a whole must not go unpunished . . . .” 13   The drafters were 
“[d]etermine[d] to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of 
these crimes . . . .“14  In Samuel Moyn’s words, perceptive if mildly 
overstated, the ICC has come to symbolize “the new dream of 
individual criminal accountability as a central feature—perhaps the 
central feature—of our current vision of international or global 
 
MIGRATION STUD. 475, 475 (2019) (observing that “public opposition to immigration 
has become a major disruptive force in developed democracies, with the emergence 
of a new family of political parties, the populist radical right”). 
 12  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 13 Id. at pmbl. 
 14 Id.  
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justice.”15  This Article argues against the view that criminal law is 
occluding other vocabularies of global justice, and instead argues 
that in the migration context, anti-impunity is part of a wider 
progressive vision. 
Commentators locate the sources of anti-impunity as a genre of 
legal rhetoric long before the Rome Statute.  The popular historical 
narrative often begins with the Nuremberg trials, continues with the 
establishment of ad-hoc tribunals,16 and culminates with the Rome 
Statute.17  Other iconic instances in which anti-impunity discourse 
has been central are Argentina’s “dirty war” trials; the debate 
surrounding South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission; 
and the discussion on how to measure justice against peace in war 
crimes cases in which Colombian paramilitary and guerrilla groups 
have been charged.18  Anti-impunity has been central to debates on 
transitional justice, a field pioneered against the backdrop of post-
authoritarian accountability efforts. 19   Recall anti-impunity’s 
Argentinian cri de cœur:  “Nunca Más!”20  Anti-impunity’s focus on 
 
 15 Moyn, supra note 9, at 69. 
 16 See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) 
(establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”)); U.N. SCOR, 3453 mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) 
(establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”)). 
 17  Vasuki Nesiah, Doing History with Impunity, in ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA,  supra note 8, at 95, 110 (providing a critique of historical 
progress among atrocity trials).   
 18 For literature focusing specifically on historical examples of anti-impunity 
in international criminal law and atrocity trials see, Karen Engle, A Genealogy of the 
Criminal Turn in Human Rights, in ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA, 
supra note 8, at 15, 39; Zinaida Miller, Anti-Impunity Politics in Post-Genocide 
Rwanda, in ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA, supra note 8, at 149, 
149; Louise Mallinder, The End of Amnesty or Regional Overreach: Interpreting the 
Erosion of South America’s Amnesty Laws, 65 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 645 (2016); Engle, 
supra note 4 at 1101 n.131; Natalie Sedacca, The ‘Turn’ to Criminal Justice in Human 
Rights Law: An Analysis in the Context of the 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement, 19 HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 315 (2019); Rodolfo Mattarollo, Impunity and International Law, 11 REVUE 
QUÉBÉCIOSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 81, 94 (1998).  
 19 See David Dyzenhaus, Transitional Justice, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 163, 164 (2003) 
(book review) (discussing the history of the concept of transitional justice); Paige 
Arthur, How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of 
Transitional Justice, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 321, 323-24 (2009) (“This essay examines the 
shift . . . from the recognition of new practical dilemmas to the development of a 
knowledge-base to address those dilemmas through the emergence of a new field 
called ‘transitional justice.’”).  
 20  See Jamal Benomar, Confronting the Past: Justice After Transitions, 4 J. 
DEMOCRACY 3, 11 (1993) (referencing a government-commissioned report that 
revealed the atrocities committed by Argentina’s military regime in the 1970s and 
1980s). 
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criminal law and on punishment has been dominant in campaigns 
against human rights violations in war and under authoritarian 
government throughout the twenty-first century.21 
Lawyers have often expressed the view that the “impunity gap” 
should constantly be “narrow[ed],” culminating in impunity’s 
ultimate “eradicat[ion].”22  It is this kind of rhetoric that will later 
become the backdrop for a critique that criminal justice has 
expanded disproportionately, somehow “colonizing” the global 
moral-political imagination.23  Indeed, the turn to criminal law in the 
human rights agenda has expanded far beyond the instances noted 
above.  For example, the rhetoric of anti-impunity has become 
central for certain feminists and is perhaps most familiarly 
associated with the work of Catherine MacKinnon. 24   As Janie 
Chuang has documented, a watershed moment in the human rights 
agenda’s turn to criminal law was the framing of the Trafficking 
Protocol of 2000. 25   Citing previous work by Anne Gallagher, 
Chuang explains how “the Trafficking Protocol, developed as a 
protocol to the UN Convention on Transnational Organized 
Crime . . . ‘unceremoniously plucked’ the trafficking mandate out of 
the human rights realm and reframed it as a criminal justice issue.”26 
In 2008, MacKinnon was appointed Special Gender Adviser to 
the Prosecutor of the ICC, with the expectation that she helps the 
court speak for the victims of sexual violence.27  In an address soon 
after her appointment, MacKinnon explained:  “The campaign of 
violence against women well-documented around the world, with 
substantial variation but also substantial impunity, is the longest-
 
 21 ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA, supra note 8, at 1. 
 22 See, e.g., Helen Duffy, Toward Eradicating Impunity: The Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, 26 SOC. JUST. 115, 116 (1999) (“To suggest that the 
creation of an ICC will single-handedly eradicate impunity would be fanciful, but 
as an essential part of the emerging system of international justice, it will make a 
real contribution to narrowing the impunity gap.”).  
 23 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 24  Janie Chuang calls this group the “neo-abolitionists”, emphasizing the 
analogy they drew between trafficking and slavery.  See Chuang, supra note 10, at 
615-16. 
 25 Id. at 614-16. 
 26  Id. (citing ANNE T. GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING 62 n. 48 (2012)). 
 27 Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor-elect, Int’l Crim. Ct., “Gender Justice and the 
ICC: Progress and Reflections”: International Conference: 10 Years Review of the 
ICC. Justice for All? The International Criminal Court 3 (Feb. 14, 2012).  
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running siege of crimes against humanity in the real sense.” 28  
Comparable to the yet-to-evolve rhetoric in the migration context, 
examined below, MacKinnon charged that societies and their 
leaders have been complicit in a worldwide criminal scheme.29 
The new frontiers of anti-impunity go further, arguably 
including the global fight against climate change.30  For example, 
Philip Alston has recently warned of a “climate apartheid.”31  The 
categorization of something as an “apartheid” aims to trigger 
fundamental rejection.  It is one of those words that should 
presumably make us say “never again.”  At a Democratic 
presidential debate in November 2019, Senator Bernie Sanders 
reiterated his proposal to criminally prosecute fossil fuel executives 
“who knowingly destroyed the planet.”32  Senator Sanders appealed 
to the sentiment human rights scholars have termed anti-impunity. 
Such views may suggest that anti-impunity is exclusively 
associated with liberal and progressive political agendas.  The truth 
is, however, that the legal and rhetorical strategy of anti-impunity 
can serve different masters.  Conservative agendas are just as likely 
as progressive ones.33  A newfound anti-impunity agenda among 
conservatives seeking to criminalize abortions, for example, 
 
 28 Catharine Mackinnon, Special Gender Adviser to the Prosecutor of the Int’l 
Crim. Ct., The Int’l Crim. Ct. and Gender Crimes, Address at Consultative 
Conference on International Criminal Justice (Sept. 11, 2009).  
 29 Id.  Other feminists have stressed the limits of international criminal law in 
achieving substantive changes.  See Doris Buss, Performing Legal Order: Some 
Feminist Thoughts on International Criminal Law, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 409, 409 (2011) 
(arguing that criminal law is an inherently limited arena for advocating for 
“feminist-inspired social change”); Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Dina Francesca Haynes & 
Naomi Cahn, Criminal Justice for Gendered Violence and Beyond, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 
425, 426 (2011) (arguing that international criminal law alone cannot adequately 
address the underlying systemic causes of gender-based violence).  
 30  See Itamar Mann, Eichmann’s Mistake: The Problem of Thoughtlessness in 
International Criminal Law, 33 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 145 passim (2020) (noting that 
knowingly taking actions that are detrimental to the environment could, in some 
points of view, be construed as international actions).  
 31  Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Hum. Rts.), 
Climate Change and Poverty, ¶ 50,  U.N. Doc./HRC/41/39 (June 25, 2019). 





 33 Political agendas that are possibly not consonant with an agenda of anti-
impunity are those that oppose criminal law as such (this may be true about certain 
libertarian or anarchistic tendencies).  See Mann, supra note 30, at 159.  
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illustrates that it is not necessarily liberal. 34   A particularly 
remarkable case-in-point is Supreme Court Justice Clarence 
Thomas’s comparison between birth control and eugenics, and its 
historical motivation “to exterminate” the black population.35  Just 
like with the concentration camps example, which I will discuss 
below in some detail, the anti-impunity vocabulary’s tendency to 
return to loaded historical examples is clear.  Other conservatives 
have called for prosecuting those responsible for abortion clinics.36  
Whether their aspirations—or Sanders’—are closer to political 
realities, remains to be seen. 
Alongside climate change, the struggle against impunity for 
violations against refugees and migrants is another new frontier 
associated with liberal and progressive views.  Be their political 
orientation as they may, the novel developments continue previous 
campaigns against impunity in the contexts of war and 
authoritarianism and build upon them.  Considering the old leftist 
critique according to which criminal law enforces an unequal 
distribution of private property,37 anti-impunity’s endurance within 
the progressive camp should not be taken for granted.  Around the 
world, criminal law has often been used to disproportionally 
incarcerate racially discriminated against or politically disfavored 
groups.38  Curiously, these new articulations of anti-impunity have 
developed precisely when optimism about the ICC as a forum for 
accountability has generally waned. 39   Rather than protecting 
 
 34 For Justice Thomas’s recent opinion on that matter, which engages anti-
impunity rhetoric, see Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780 
(2019) (discussing the history of birth control as it relates to eugenics and forced 
sterilization).  See also Helena Alviar García & Karen Engle, The Distributive Politics 
of Impunity and Anti-Impunity: Lessons from Four Decades of Colombian Peace 
Negotiations, in ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA, supra note 8, at 
216, 226 (noting that in Colombia, “[a]nti-impunity became the cry of both the left 
and the right, albeit not always at the same time”).  
 35 Box, 139 S. Ct. at 1788 (citing Birth Control or Race Control? Sanger and the 
Negro Project, Margaret Sanger Papers Project Newsletter #28 (2001), 
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sanger/articles/bc_or_race_control.php 
[https://perma.cc/L6KS-72ER]). 
 36 See Mann, supra note 30, at 166-70. 
 37 For a more nuanced account, see Paul Q. Hirst, Marx and Engels on Law, 
Crime and Morality, 1 ECON. & SOC’Y 28 passim (1972) (articulating and emphasizing 
the transformations in Marx’s theory of law, and thus highlighting its complexities).  
 38 See Engle, supra note 4, at 1125-26. 
 39 For information on how the expectations of the ICC are now generally more 
modest than they were at its founding see, ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
AGENDA, supra note 8, at 4; Engle, supra note 4, at 1116-17, 1125-26; Moyn, supra note 
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refugees and migrants, criminal law is applied ever more frequently 
to block access to asylum.40  What is the lasting appeal of criminal 
law among liberal and progressive advocates working in the field of 
migration? 
At the center of the international human rights system lie 
multilateral conventions, sometimes equipped with monitoring 
systems or quasi-constitutional tribunals, designed to discipline 
states.41  The anti-impunity discourse, however, goes beyond this 
focus on states.  In the international law sphere, anti-impunity 
reflects a proclivity towards sources of law that seem not to require 
explicit state consent, i.e., those of jus cogens.  It adopts the language 
of absolute prohibition binding upon all (“erga omnes”). 42   Anti-
impunity’s emphasis on criminal accountability, particularly but not 
only in the guise of international criminal justice, relates to its reliance 
on such absolute imperatives.43 
Both the vocabulary of jus cogens and that of criminal law are 
exceptional in the international human rights law environment, in 
which states are still the dominant actors.  The two emphasize the 
 
9, at 71; David Luban, After the Honeymoon: Reflections on the Current State of 
International Criminal Justice, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 505 passim (2013).  
 40  See, e.g., Cathryn Costello & Michelle Foster, Non-refoulement as Custom 
and Jus Cogens? Putting the Prohibition to the Test, 46 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 273, 275 
(2016); SARAH HAMMERL, UNITED AGAINST INHUMANITY, ASYLUM CRIMINALISATION IN 
EUROPE AND ITS HUMANITARIAN IMPLICATIONS  2 (2019); UN Special Rapporteur 
Attacks “International Regime of Impunity” Over Migrant Deaths, U.N. HUM. RTS. 
OFF. HIGH COMM’R (Oct. 27, 2017) (referencing a UN-commissioned report on the 
EU’s criminalization of asylum seekers), 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=2
2322&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/WP6D-2VS2].  For additional information, see 
the below discussion on “crimmigration,” infra note 123 (citing the Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions’ report critiquing 
the international community for failing to protect migrants and refugees).  
 41 See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force 
Jan. 4, 1969); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for 
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 
Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1966); Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened 
for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987).    
 42 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga 
Omnes, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 passim (1996) (arguing that when an 
international crime achieves jus cogens status, states should be obligated to proceed 
against perpetrators of such crimes).  
 43 See Akhavan, supra note 2, at 9 (explaining how the ICTY and ICTR helped 
introduce a structure for criminal accountability in the international criminal justice 
system). 
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responsibility of individuals rather than stopping at the 
responsibilities of states.44  Some argue that corporations should be 
held criminally liable for their actions, too; once again going beyond 
international law’s traditional focus.45  In a world in which violators 
include for-profit corporations, part of the appeal of criminal law 
emanates from an expectation that it can fill an accountability 
deficit.46  The new anti-impunity that has emerged in the context of 
migration has been drawn, considerably, by this effort to extend 
international accountability from states to individuals and 
corporations. 
In my scholarship, I have identified a structural accountability 
deficit when it comes to irregular migrants, which I have argued is 
hard-wired in international law.47   Among scholars and activists 
seeking to defend migrants from border violence, extending 
accountability to individuals and corporations has sometimes 
seemed like a compelling way to potentially fill that deficit.  But 
what do the concrete examples of “the new anti-impunity” look 
like?  Before discussing the strategic and philosophical 
underpinnings of this orientation to law, I first need to demonstrate 
that the phenomenon exists. 
III. THE NEW ANTI-IMPUNITY 
a. Foundational Obligations Towards Migrants 
For a couple of decades, commentators have argued that the 
duty of non-refoulement—barring the return of refugees to where 
they may suffer persecution—has attained the status of jus cogens:  it 
 
 44  See id. at 27 (discussing the ICC’s role in ensuring that member states 
“impose individual accountability for international crimes.”); Thomas Weatherall, 
Jus Cogens and Sovereign Immunity: Reconciling Divergence in Contemporary 
Jurisprudence, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1151, 1154-55 (2015) (“Individual responsibility is at 
the core of the legal regime of jus cogens . . . .”). 
 45 See Mordechai Kremnitzer, A Possible Case for Imposing Criminal Liability on 
Corporations in International Criminal Law, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 909, 909 (2010). 
 46 On migration and accountability generally, see Cathryn Costello & Itamar 
Mann, Border Justice: Migration and Accountability for Human Rights Violations, 
GERMAN L.J. 311 (2020).  
 47  Itamar Mann, Maritime Legal Black Holes: Migration and Rightlessness in 
International Law, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 347, 357, 368 (2018).  
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has become a peremptory norm of international law, binding upon 
all regardless of state consent.48 
Though the claim has often been questioned, its very prevalence 
is indicative.  For some groups, non-refoulement has been part of a 
moral vocabulary experienced as a kind of “higher law.” 49  
Consider, for example, the “sanctuary” tradition practiced in 
churches and other religious organizations to protect refugees in 
danger of deportation.  “When Churches and their congregations 
confer ‘sanctuary,’” wrote Richard Falk in 1988, “they are 
interposing their bodies and lives between the government and 
these beleaguered individuals from overseas.” 50   These acts of 
solidarity are of course not criminal law measures.  They do not 
reflect, in and of themselves, an impetus towards punishment.  
Indeed, rather than a strong crime-and-punishment discourse, they 
belong to a vocabulary of civil disobedience.51  They therefore may 
seem odd as a starting point for a discussion of anti-impunity in the 
migration and refugee contexts. 
Yet, the perception that non-refoulement has become jus cogens 
has been an important pre-condition for the new anti-impunity.  
First, jus cogens obligations are thought of as binding upon 
individuals.  Such obligations thus help transform questions of 
fundamental rights and state duties into questions of individual 
responsibility.  Second, they have often rested on an analogy to 
historic heroic acts in the face of atrocity, such as hiding members of 
persecuted groups from Nazi persecutors. 52   They, therefore, 
encourage an analogy between historic atrocities and present 
policies.  Third, they reflect an aspiration to break free from the 
 
 48 See, e.g., Costello & Foster, supra note 40, at 307-08. 
 49 For an account of the place of moral imperatives towards migrants and 
refugees in international law, see ITAMAR MANN, HUMANITY AT SEA: MARITIME 
MIGRATION AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016).  See also MORITZ 
BAUMGÄRTEL, DEMANDING RIGHTS: EUROPE’S SUPRANATIONAL COURTS AND THE 
DILEMMA OF MIGRANT VULNERABILITY 137-52 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2019).   
 50 Richard Falk, Accountability, Asylum, and Sanctuary: Challenging Our Political 
and Legal Imagination, 16 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 199, 201 (1988).  See also MANN, 
supra note 49, at 211 (commenting on Falk’s observations); Jon Sharman, Pilots Stop 
222 Asylum Seekers Being Deported from Germany by Refusing to Fly, INDEP. (Dec. 5, 
2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/german-pilots-
refuse-deport-asylum-seekers-lufthansa-angela-merkel-migrants-a8092276.html 
[https://perma.cc/H57H-KH98] (providing another example of such instances of 
civil disobedience).  
 51  See Itamar Mann, The Right to Perform Rescue at Sea: Jurisprudence and 
Drowning, 21 GERMAN L.J. 598, 614-18 (2020).  
 52 See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 208, 255.  
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strictures of extant political conditions and transcend them 
altogether:   rather than a vision of political transformation through 
majoritarian institutions, the paradigm is one of direct action. 53  
These three aspects of the sanctuary tradition prepared the ground 
for a turn to impunity in the context of refugee and migrant rights 
and have remained its central tenets.  To the extent that we can talk 
of migration anti-impunity as a movement, the three remain its 
distinct characteristics. 
Starting from the first decade of the twenty-first century, human 
rights organizations began to report on human rights violations 
against asylum seekers in detention.  Little by little, we started to see 
invocations of stricter legal standards, particularly the prohibition 
of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.54  Contrary to 
previous human rights reporting on refugees, which directed 
allegations of torture nearly exclusively against past events in states 
producing refugees, now the “host” states were sometimes alleged 
culprits.55  The new allegations of torture are often also directed 
against border enforcement agencies and corporations 
implementing border policies for developed countries.56 
 
 53 See generally Costello & Foster, supra note 40, at 276 n. 42 (discussing the 
“custom plus” approach to identify norms of customary international law that have 
achieved jus cogens status); Georg Schwarzenberger, International Jus Cogens?, 43 
TEX. L. REV. 455, 456 (1965) (explaining the features of jus cogens); Weatherall, supra 
note 44, at 1154-55 (comparing jus cogens and the tradition of international law in 
conjunction with Nuremberg prosecutions); Jens David Ohlin, In Praise of Jus 
Cogens’ Conceptual Incoherence, 63 MCGILL L.J. 701, 711, 718 (2018) (demonstrating 
how jus cogens is a compromise and justifying it based on a theory of fiduciary 
duties).  
 54  See, e.g., Claire Henderson, Australia’s Treatment of Asylum Seekers: From 
Human Rights Violations to Crimes Against Humanity, 12 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1161, 1175 
(2014) (noting that Australia’s treatment of asylum seekers is likely not in 
compliance with multiple multilateral conventions).  
 55 See Priscilla Alvarez, Exclusive: Watchdog Finds Detainees ‘Standing on Toilets’ 
for Breathing Room at Border Facility Holding 900 People in Space Meant for 125, CNN 
(May 31, 2019), https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/31/politics/inspector-general-
warns-overcrowded-conditions/index.html [https://perma.cc/9WLG-W5T4] 
(describing “’dangerous overcrowding’ and unsanitary conditions at an El Paso, 
Texas, Border Patrol processing facility”); The Ed. Bd., Children Shouldn’t Be Dying 
at the Border.  Here’s How You Can Help, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/24/opinion/border-kids-immigration-help.
html [https://perma.cc/WAX2-S7MF] (exposing the treatment of child asylum 
seekers at the border by US immigration officials). 
 56 See, e.g., Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Squalid Conditions at Border Detention Centers, 
Government Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/us/politics/border-center-migrant-dete
ntion.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share [https://perma.cc/L25M-QC8S] (describing 
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Under customary international law as well as under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), “[n]o exceptional 
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, 
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be 
invoked as a justification of torture.”57  International law imposes 
such prohibitions on states, but criminal law too proscribes them, 
both in the domestic and in the international spheres. 58   As for 
international criminal law, the Rome Statute tells us the 
foundational status granted to torture includes other related 
behaviors, in a list of categories that is not positively finite.  While 
systematized torture is defined as a crime against humanity in 
Article 7(1)(e), Article 7(1)(e) similarly criminalizes imprisonment 
“in violation of fundamental rules of international law;” and Article 
7(1)(k) refers to “other inhumane acts.” 59   The three provisions 
illustrate the “open texture” of international criminal law.60   Such a 
texture suggests that forms of violence not previously considered 
international crimes can be added.61 
Through the doctrinal avenue of “crimes against humanity” and 
the notion that some legal rules cannot be compromised, advocates 
have made the transition from state responsibility to individual 
criminal liability.  This is the basic component of anti-impunity 
rhetoric.  In the following subsections, I trace how the transition has 
been made in three different regional contexts:  Australia, the EU, 
and the U.S. 
 
the findings of an official watchdog report revealing “overcrowded, squalid 
conditions” in U.S. migrant centers); Chantal Da Silva, U.S. Border Patrol Accused of 
Forcing Migrant Families Sleeping Outside  to Wake Up and Stand Every Three Hours, 
NEWSWEEK (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.newsweek.com/us-border-patrol-
accused-forcing-migrant-families-sleeping-outside-wake-stand-1382858 
[https://perma.cc/RFM4-T7WS] (discussing accusations that border patrol agents 
committed inhumane abuses against asylum seekers in holding areas); Tendayi E. 
Achiume et al., The Situation in Nauru and Manus Island: Liability for Crimes against 




 57  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, supra note 41, art. 2(2).  
 58 Indeed, the criminalisation of torture is obligatory under the Convention 
Against Torture.  See id., art. 4. 
 59 Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 7(1)(e)-(f), (k).  
 60 On the “open texture of law,” see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-
128 (3d ed. 2012). 
 61 This of course raises a concern in terms of the principle of legality, nullum 
crimen sine lege. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
690 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:3 
i. Australia 
In 2001, Australia introduced the “Pacific Solution,” whereby 
refugees seeking asylum were sent for “processing” in Australian-
funded detention centers in Nauru and Manus Island, Papua New 
Guinea.62  Modeled on the United States’ earlier offshore treatment 
of asylum seekers in Guantanamo Bay, Australian offshore 
detention stretched rule of law principles.63 
Scholar and activist responses to the Pacific Solution arguably 
pioneered the new anti-impunity.  Influenced by reports on human 
rights violations in Nauru and Papua New Guinea, Penny Green 
and Mike Grewcock argued in 2002 that “the failure by states to 
positively embrace the right to asylum . . . have resulted in the 
systematic and organised breach of human rights, . . . which can 
usefully be defined as state crime.”64  While the Australian model 
was the most draconian, the authors also pointed their fingers 
towards Europe:  “the new Europe is not just a fortress, but a bastion 
of state crime.” 65   The “state crime” paradigm, anchored in 
criminology (rather than law), rests on an analogy between state 
policies and crimes.66  It is thus not per se a criminal allegation—the 
latter can be directed towards an individual or a corporation, but not 
 
 62 See Ishan Ashutosh & Alison Mountz, Migration Management for the Benefit 
of Whom?  Interrogating the Work of the International Organization for Migration, 15 
CITIZENSHIP STUD. 21, 31 (2011) (noting the role of the International Organization of 
Migration (“IOM”) in putting in place this infrastructure); Itamar Mann, Dialectic of 
Transnationalism: Unauthorized Migration and Human Rights 1993-2013, 54 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 315, 334 (2013).  
 63  See DANIEL GHEZELBASH, REFUGE LOST: ASYLUM IN AN INTERDEPENDENT 
WORLD 130-133 (2018); see also Tania Penovic & Azadeh Dastyari, Boatloads of 
Incongruity: The Evolution of Australia’s Offshore Processing Regime 13 AUSTL. J. HUM. 
RTS. 33, 34 (2007); Mann, supra note 62.  
 64 Penny Green & Mike Grewcock, The War Against Illegal Immigration: State 
Crime and the Construction of a European Identity, 14 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 87, 88 
(2002).  
 65 Id. at 88, 98.  Coming from the perspective of criminology, the authors 
explain that state crime refers to instances when the state engages in violence that 
would be criminal “if performed by ‘individual citizens.’”  Id. at 98.  They therefore 
rely on a kind of hypothetical and do not necessary imply that suspects should be 
investigated and perhaps prosecuted under extant law.  Id.  
 66 For background on the “state crime” paradigm in criminology, see Herman 
Schwendinger & Julia Schwendinger, Defenders of Order or Guardians of Human 
Rights? 5 ISSUES CRIMINOLOGY 123, 141 (1970); Stanley Cohen, Human Rights and 
Crimes of the State: The Culture of Denial, 26 AUSTL. & N.Z.  J. CRIMINOLOGY 97, 97-103 
(1993).  
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towards a state.67  Certainly, it sets in motion a way of thinking in 
which migrants and refugees are the victims of guilty acts (actus rei), 
perpetrated by actors who entertain criminal intent (mens rea).68 
Such concerns were partially assuaged when, in 2008, Australia 
temporarily ceased its offshore detention. 69   But following 
Australia’s return to the scheme in 2012,70 Member of Parliament 
Andrew Wilkie took an additional step, demanding that the ICC 
investigate Tony Abbott’s government for crimes against asylum 
seekers.71  Wilkie prepared a communication under Article 15 of the 
Rome Statute, calling upon the prosecutor to initiate an investigation 
based on the information he provided (proprio motu). 72   As he 
explained, “’[i]n my application I have particularly named crimes 
against humanity, such as the forced relocation of people, obviously 
to the Republic of Nauru or Papua New Guinea.’” 73   On the 
academic side, Claire Henderson quickly followed and argued in 
2014 that Australian policies constituted a prima facie international 
criminal case against Australian agents.74  The publication of her 
paper in the Journal of International Criminal Justice, a well-
regarded and high-profile peer-reviewed publication dedicated to 
international criminal law, was a signal.  The argument about 
 
 67 See Green & Grewcock, supra note 64, at 98. 
 68 See generally Mann, supra note 30 (discussing how potential defendants may 
be unknowingly committing acts that are illegal).  




 70 Id. 
 71 See Amy Maguire, Will the International Criminal Court Prosecute Australia for 
Crimes Against Humanity?, CONVERSATION (Oct. 26, 2014, 11:29 PM), 
https://theconversation.com/will-the-international-criminal-court-prosecute-
australia-for-crimes-against-humanity-33363 [https://perma.cc/3G7P-NRQ7].  
 72 Id.; Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 15. 
 73  Shalailah Medhora, Asylum Seekers: Andrew Wilkie Takes Australia to 
International Criminal Court, GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2014/oct/22/asylum-seekers-an
drew-wilkie-takes-australia-to-international-criminal-court 
[https://perma.cc/9XTY-GPSN].  Wilkie submitted his full communiqué on 
January 23, 2015.  See COMMUNIQUÉ FOR THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR REGARDING 
MR. ANDREW WILKIE MP’S APPLICATION RELATING TO CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN 
AUSTRALIA, Ref: OTP-CR-322/14 (Jan. 23, 2015), https://andrewwilkie.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/Brief-for-the-ICC-OTP-CR-322-14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/36LW-QK3K].   
 74 Henderson, supra note 54, at 1173-74. 
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international crimes against refugees committed by Australian 
agents was no longer perceived as “off the wall.”75 
Henderson emphasized the crimes of persecution and 
imprisonment in violation of fundamental rules of international 
law.76  Unlike Wilkie, she expressed the view that deportation may 
not be the “relevant prohibited act”. 77   These doctrinal 
disagreements, which will continue among advocates of a criminal 
law framing for border violence, reflect that the relevant 
interpretations were far from settled.  As will be the case in the 
European and U.S. contexts, they highlight an emerging agreement 
that certain acts of violence committed by state agents against 
asylum seekers are indeed criminal.  The question would now be, 
how do we best express that within the boxes of the relevant legal 
text? 
In 2016, Vincent Chetail published another remarkable piece, 
taking Australia as one case study, and laying the groundwork for a 
more general turn to anti-impunity.78  Chetail’s opening paragraph 
conveys the sentiment that impunity for violations against migrants 
had indeed approached something like a worldwide criminal 
scheme.79  Referencing MP Wilkie’s submission, Chetail asks:  
 
Is there any blood on my hands?  This is a question shared 
by an increasing number of people who observe or carry out 
migration control in the Global North and the rest of the 
world.  This questioning has become a particularly 
controversial issue in Australia where the policy of returning 
asylum-seekers and the accompanying mistreatment are 
alleged to amount to crimes against humanity.80   
 
While the phrase “alleged,” taken out of context, may connote 
passive reporting on a preexisting interpretation of the law, Chetail 
advances his own interpretation to the effect mentioned.  A 
longstanding tradition among lawyers, the idea is to set in motion a 
 
 75 On the importance of “off the wall” arguments in legal interpretation, see 
Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982).  
 76 Henderson, supra note 54, at 1178-80. 
 77 Id. at 1176-78. 
 78 Vincent Chetail, Is There any Blood on my Hands? Deportation as a Crime of 
International Law, 29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 917, 917-19 (2016).   
 79 Id. at 917.  
 80 Id. (footnotes omitted).   
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novel legal interpretation while conveying that it is only another 
step in a well-trodden path.81   
Chetail doubles down on deportation as the relevant 
international criminal prohibition for the protection of asylum 
seekers and migrants. 82   Under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, 
deportation may constitute a crime against humanity when 
conducted as part of a “widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”83  
Citing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia’s Tadić, Chetail points out that an armed conflict is not a 
necessary condition for deportation to constitute an attack against a 
civilian population.84  Unlike war crimes, crimes against humanity 
can be perpetrated in times of peace.85  Chetail even goes so far as to 
demonstrate that deportations may constitute a crime of genocide.86  
In his conclusion, he discusses Australian interceptions of boat 
migrants and the policy of delivering them to offshore detention 
sites, dispassionately observing:  “there are some reasonable 
grounds to argue that the systematic nature of these unlawful 
deportations associated with the state policy of arbitrary detention 
may reach the threshold required to be considered a crime against 
humanity under conditions detailed in the present article.”87   
On February 22, 2017, a group of seventeen lawyers, Chetail 
among them, filed another Communication under Article 15 of the 
Rome Statute against Australian agents. 88   This time, the 
communication came from outside of Australia and was facilitated 
by Stanford Law School’s International Human Rights and Conflict 
 
 81 On the relevance of this method to international law, see Başak Çali, On 
Interpretivism and International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 805 (2009).  For effective 
examples of this move when aiming to protect the rights of asylum seekers and 
migrants see the works of Violeta Moreno-Lax, such as Violeta Moreno-Lax, Seeking 
Asylum in the Mediterranean: Against a Fragmentary Reading of EU Member States’ 
Obligations Accruing at Sea, 23 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 174 passim (2011).  
 82 Chetail, supra note 78, at 919-40.  
 83 Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 7.    
 84 Chetail, supra note 78, at 923.   
 85 Id.   
 86 Id. at 933-40.   
 87 Id. at 943.   
 88 Achiume, supra note 56. The full list of signatories includes: Tendayi E. 
Achiume, T. Alexander Aleinikoff, James Cavallaro, Vincent Chetail, Robert Cryer, 
Gearóid Ó Cuinn, Tom J. Dannenbaum, Kevin Jon Heller, Ioannis Kalpouzos, 
Itamar Mann, Sara Kendall, Makau Mutua, Gregor Noll, Anne Orford, Diala 
Shamas, Gerry Simpson, and Beth Van Schaack.  Id.   
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Resolution Clinic and the Global Legal Action Network (“GLAN”).89  
Together with Ioannis Kalpouzos and Diala Shamas, I was also one 
of the principal authors of the complaint.  We alleged several sub-
titles of crimes against humanity, including imprisonment (Article 
7(1)(e) of the Rome Statute), torture (Article 7(1)(f)), persecution 
(Article 7(1)(h)), deportation (Article 7(1)(d)), and other inhumane 
acts (Article 7(1)(k)). 90   We particularly highlighted questions of 
corporate liability pertaining to companies that administered 
Australia’s facilities.91   
In July 2017, U Ne Oo, an activist from Sydney, made an 
additional Article 15 submission. 92   This third communication 
focuses on a rather unorthodox interpretation of the crime of 
enslavement (Article 7 1. c.) under the Rome Statute.  Allegedly, the 
Australian government has “lent” asylum seekers to private 
corporations, so that they generate a profit from their business of 
running Australian “processing centers” on Nauru and Manus.93  
While it is unclear if the interpretation of enslavement is sound, the 
categorization illuminates a crucial aspect of the Australian situation 
which other communications highlight as well:  Australia has not 
only “externalized” its enforcement to Nauru and Manus as states;94 
it also outsourced its violations to corporations and privatized 
them.95  The new anti-impunity discourse, like earlier instances of 
 
 89 Id. at 9.  
 90 Id. at 5.   
 91 Id. at 101-06. 
 92 U Ne Oo, Enslavement in Manus Island and Nauru, Summary of Allegations, 
http://www.netipr.org/saorg/docs/enclosure_icc-reply-n-comm.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J47W-2C3Z].  See also Dr. U Ne Oo, Letter to Australia Foreign 
Minister, ROHINGYA BLOGGER (Jan 27, 2013), 
http://www.rohingyablogger.com/2013/01/letter-to-australia-foreign-minister-
by.html?zx=373835d249704281 [https://perma.cc/9HNG-7A78].  
 93 Id. ¶¶ 19-21.   
 94 On “externalization” of border control, see Ashutosh & Mountz, supra note 
62, at 28, 31-32; Sherally Munshi, Immigration, Imperialism, and the Legacies of Indian 
Exclusion, 28 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 51, 99 (2016); Bill Frelick, Ian M. Kysel & Jennifer 
Podkul, The Impact of Externalization of Migration Controls on the Rights of Asylum 
Seekers and Other Migrants, 4 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 190, 193-99 (2016).  See 
also B. Shaw Drake & Elizabeth Gibson, Vanishing Protection: Access to Asylum at the 
Border, 21 CUNY L. REV. 91, 115-17 (2017); Rachael E. De Orio, Seeking Sanctuary 
Across the Sea: Why the Influx of Refugees and Asylum Seekers to Greece Requires Major 
Policy Changes, 41 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 51, 70, 97-98 (2018). 
 95 Achiume, supra note 56, at 101-06.  Relevant enterprises include Spanish 
Ferrovial, Transfield, Broadspectrum, and most recently Ferrovial.   
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such discourse, aimed to activate basic liberal commitments against 
historical atrocities—in this case, that of slavery.96   
At the time of publication, the applications have been rejected.97  
Perhaps the latest iteration in the development of anti-impunity on 
the Australian front is a class action filed on December 10, 2018, 
arguing the country subjected refugees to crimes against humanity 
in the offshore sites. 98   Though the lawsuit seeks civil damages 
rather than criminal punishment, the appeal to crimes against 
humanity reveals ripple effects of the new anti-impunity discourse 
beyond strictly punitive measures.  As Gabrielle Holly has 
emphasized, the synthesis between international criminal law and 
tort law has yielded a measure of accountability, even if impunity 
largely remains.99   
ii. The European Union 
On the European front, the framing of abuses against refugees 
and migrants as criminal offenses first emerged around the same 
time as it did in Australia.  Namely, after the Rome Statute came into 
force in 2002.  The European migration anti-impunity discourse 
arguably started with efforts to criminalize human trafficking, 
rather than direct allegations against border enforcement policies.100 
 
 96 Compare the reference to slavery and trade in humans in the Libyan context, 
infra note 126, with the use of the concentration camps analogy in the United States 
context, infra notes 208, 212, 213, and Mann, supra note 30, at 18.  
 97 Letter from Phakiso Mochochoko, Dir., Jurisdiction, Complementarity & 
Coop. Div., Int’l Crim. Ct., to Kate Allingham, Off. of Andrew Wilkie MP (Feb. 12, 
2020). 
 98 See Helen Davidson, Australia Subjected Refugees to Crimes against Humanity, 




 99 Gabrielle Holly, Challenges to Australia’s Offshore Detention Regime and the 
Limits of Strategic Tort Litigation, 21 GERMAN L.J. 549, 550-51 (2020).   
 100  See Engle, supra note 4, at 1073-79; Anne Gallagher & Paul Holmes, 
Developing an Effective Criminal Justice Response to Human Trafficking: Lessons from the 
Front Line, 18 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 318, 319-21 (2008); see also HAMMERL, supra note 
40, at 14 (discussing criminalization of humanitarian action relating to assistance 
for refugees in Europe).   
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During the drafting of the Rome Statute, the drafters 
contemplated if human trafficking would be criminalized.101  Article 
7(2)(c) specifies that the definition of “enslavement” includes 
ownership over persons exercised in the context of trafficking.102  
Starting from the beginning of the twenty-first century, an anti-
impunity discourse therefore aimed to protect migrants and 
refugees from traffickers, sometimes by reference to international 
criminal law.103  This push went hand in hand with a larger feminist 
campaign, as trafficked individuals are often female victims of 
sexual violence.104  Notably, this feminist push towards criminal law 
generated controversy within the feminist movement.  While it was 
vociferously advanced by MacKinnon and others,105 Janie Chuang 
and others objected on feminist grounds.106   
Importantly, border enforcement policies also quickly adopted 
the fight against traffickers and smugglers, latching on to its anti-
impunity bent.  As trafficking and smuggling represented constant 
trespass across national borders, eliminating the perpetrators 
gradually became a central priority of European border 
governance.107   This ad-hoc alignment between certain feminists, 
refugee advocates, and states seeking to close their borders 
 
 101 See Tom Obokata, Trafficking of Human Beings as a Crime against Humanity: 
Some Implications for the International Legal System, 54 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 445, 448-
53 (2005) (analyzing human trafficking as a crime against humanity under the Rome 
Statute).   
 102 Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 7(2)(c).   
 103  See, e.g., Gallagher & Holmes, supra note 100, at 319; Anne Gallagher, 
Human Rights and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 975, 983-84 (2001) (providing an example of 
the discourse that emerged aimed at protecting migrants and refugees from 
traffickers).  
 104 Engle, supra note 4, at 1078; see also Gallagher, supra note 103, at 983-88 
(detailing contested debates over prostitution’s possible inclusion in the Rome 
Statute’s definition of trafficking).  But see Chuang, supra note 10, at 615 (criticizing 
the divisive and hotly debated focus on the sex-sector in the legal definition of 
trafficking as problematic).   
 105 See MacKinnon, supra note 28; see also Robin L. West, Legitimating the 
Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442, 1442-59 (1993) 
(providing a critique on Beyond Rape).  For a critique of MacKinnon’s interventions 
in this context, see Janet Halley, Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the 
Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in Positive International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 1 passim (2008).  
 106 See Chuang, supra note 10, at 614-15.  
 107 See Gallagher, supra note 103, at 976-77, 998; Francois Crépeau, The Fight 
Against Migrant Smuggling: Migration Containment Over Refugee Protection, in THE 
REFUGEE CONVENTION AT FIFTY: A VIEW FROM FORCED MIGRATION STUDIES 173 (Joanne 
van Selm et al. eds., 2003).   
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illustrates the political ambiguousness of the anti-impunity 
agenda.108  Critics would later raise the question of whether this 
political ambiguity should ultimately rule anti-impunity out of a 
vocabulary for social change.109   As I explain below, I think the 
answer is no.110   
In 2010, a Human Rights Watch report accused Ukraine of using 
torture practices against asylum seekers.111  The report highlighted 
the role states on the outer margins of Europe had in the evolving 
ill-treatment.112  As observers noted, the freer the movement within 
Europe became, the worse the violence became at the EU’s external 
borders.113  Similarly, several international organizations, as well as 
non-international organizations, accused Greece of exposing asylum 
seekers to torture and inhumane and degrading treatment. 114  
Greece is relatively accessible from Iraq and Syria, places where new 
political crises continually developed following the United States’ 
 
 108 See Abigail Schwartz, Sex Trafficking in Cambodia, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 371, 
374 (2004).   
 109 See infra Part IV. 
 110 Id.   
 111 Ukraine: Migrants and Asylum Seekers Tortured, Mistreated, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Dec. 16, 2010), https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/12/16/ukraine-migrants-and-
asylum-seekers-tortured-mistreated [https://perma.cc/F4YW-5QVQ].   
 112 Id.   
 113 HAMMERL, supra note 40, at 8; Kenan Malik, How We All Colluded in Fortress 
Europe, GUARDIAN (June 10, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/10/sunday-essay-how
-we-colluded-in-fortress-europe-immigration [https://perma.cc/RKU5-PQME].  
Compare with early critiques of European economic integration, recounted in 
QUINN SLOBODIAN, GLOBALISTS: THE END OF EMPIRE AND THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERALISM 
182-217 (2018).  This is what is referred to, in popular commentary, as the dynamic 
of “fortress Europe.”   
 114 See No End in Sight: The Mistreatment of Asylum Seekers in Greece, OMCT SOS-
TORTURE NETWORK (Aug. 21, 2019), 
https://www.omct.org/en/resources/news-releases/no-end-in-sight-the-mistrea
tement-of-asylum-seekers-in-greece [https://perma.cc/GWV5-LSUD] (describing 
the mistreatment of asylum seekers in Greece).   
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invasion of Iraq.115   Allegations of “pushbacks”116  and torture in 
Greece paved the way for the impunity turn:  as emphasized above, 
torture can be analyzed as a matter of state responsibility, but it is 
also a criminal offense.  Critical reports about Greece culminated in 
a landmark judgment at the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”) in MSS v. Belgium and Greece.117  The Court prevented 
returns to Greece from other European countries, 118  because 
conditions in Greece amounted to violations of Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture 
and inhuman and degrading treatment.119  
In its MSS judgment, the ECtHR opined that the inhuman and 
degrading treatment of asylum seekers was rampant in Greek 
detention centers.  Under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, when 
imprisonment “in violation of fundamental rules of international 
law” is part of a “widespread or systematic attack directed against 
any civilian population,” it constitutes a crime against humanity.120  
As noted above, such an attack does not require the backdrop of an 
armed conflict.121  Taken together, the MSS finding and the rules of 
international criminal law therefore suggest a crime against 
humanity was committed against asylum seekers in Greece.  Far 
from a merely technical result produced out of mixing two 
 
 115  Stuck in a Revolving Door, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 26, 2008), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/11/26/stuck-revolving-door/iraqis-and-oth
er-asylum-seekers-and-migrants-greece/turkey [https://perma.cc/GD4A-W4W4] 
(emphasizing the consequences “generalized violence” in Iraq following the 2003 
intervention on asylum seekers arrivals and asylum seekers processing in Greece).  
On the calamitous results of American intervention in Iraq, see generally Asli Bâli 
& Aziz Rana, Constitutionalism and the American Imperial Imagination, 85 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 257, 281 (2018).  On the use of the term “pushbacks,” see Niamh Keady-Tabbal 




 116 Pushbacks are deportations of asylum seekers contrary to the rule of non-
refoulment.  See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, opened for 
signature July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954).  
 117 The word ‘impunity’ appears once in the MSS judgment, where it refers to 
conditions in Afghanistan.  See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 28, ¶ 
197 (2011).    
 118 Id. at 98, ¶ 3-9 (Villiger, J., dissenting).  
 119 Id. ¶ 424 (3) (unanimous declaration of a Greek violation of Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights).    
 120 Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 7.  
 121  Chetail, supra note 78, at 923 (stating that a systematic attack against 
civilians “does not require a nexus with an armed conflict and can be thus 
committed in time of peace”).   
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international legal “regimes” (international human rights law and 
international criminal law), the inference seemed to encapsulate a 
notable development:  policies that seem to be part of the banal, 
everyday practice of border enforcement are in fact egregious crimes 
which many developed states are complicit in.122  
That, at least, was the core of a legal argument Ioannis 
Kalpouzos and I made in 2015, where we emphasized the 
imprisonment aspect of immigration detention (Article 7(1)(e)).123  
We did not frame allegations exclusively or even primarily against 
Greek agents.  During the period we examined, border guards from 
many European countries were deployed in Greece, as part of an 
operation facilitated by Frontex, the European Union’s border 
enforcement agency. 124  The distribution of responsibility among 
multiple states, we argued, is an institutional design intended to 
diffuse accountability.125  Along with the “externalization” of border 
enforcement, and the privatization of control, the legal architecture 
that evolved at the fault lines between “developed” and 
“developing” states arguably generated a mode of impunity.126  
Violations in Greece largely persisted over the coming years, 
with the country’s European lenders rushing contributions for 
detention facilities, but largely failing to alleviate conditions in 
them.127  At the same time, another significant European struggle 
against impunity for the violation of migrant rights occurred as a 
 
 122 See Agnes Callamard (Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions), Unlawful Death of Refugees and 
Migrants, U.N. Doc. A/72/335 (Aug. 15, 2017), 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1725806.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3MS7-NNWS] (detailing killing by state and non-state actors of 
migrants during their flight as a human rights crisis).  
 123 Ioannis Kalpouzos & Itamar Mann, Banal Crimes against Humanity: The Case 
of Asylum Seekers in Greece, 16 MELB. J. INT’L L. 1, 14 (2015) (describing the 
imprisonment of asylum seekers as inhumane). 
 124 Id. at 9. 
 125 Id. at 22-24; see also Melanie Fink, Frontex Working Arrangements: Legitimacy 
and Human Rights Concerns Regarding ‘Technical Relationships’, 28 MERKOURIOS-
UTRECHT J. INT’L & EUR. L. 20, 21 (2012) (emphasizing the shift of border control to 
“third countries”).  
 126 Mann, supra note 62, at 346-47. 
 127 Leonidas K. Cheliotis, Behind the Veil of Philoxenia: The Politics of Immigration 
Detention in Greece, 10 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 725, 737 (2013); EUROPEAN UNION 
AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (FRA), COPING WITH A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
EMERGENCY: THE SITUATION OF PERSONS CROSSING THE GREEK LAND BORDER IN AN 
IRREGULAR MANNER 6 (2011), 
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1500-Greek-border-
situation-report2011_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/39XQ-UASY]. 
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response to policies conducted in the Central Mediterranean.  Before 
the Libyan 2011 revolution, Italy had already established 
externalized border control with Qaddafi’s government.128  Not long 
after Qaddafi was overthrown, cooperative border governance fell 
into disarray, with Italy scrambling to cooperate with multiple 
Libyan militias, often indistinguishable from migrant traffickers.129  
Alongside overwhelming violence against migrants in Libyan 
camps,130 and the unending catastrophe of migrant deaths at sea,131 
a primary reason for the shift to anti-impunity was also a legal 
development.  In 2011, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor opened its 
investigation into the situation in Libya, following a referral by the 
UN Security Council. 132   The investigation came to buttress an 
argument that crimes against migrants and refugees were 
committed. 
Indeed, in her statement of May 8, 2017, the ICC Prosecutor 
explained to the UN Security Council that the investigation also 
concerns “serious and widespread crimes against migrants 
attempting to transit through Libya.”133  Fatou Bensouda labeled 
 
 128  Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between the Italian 
Republic and the Great Libyan Arab Giamariria, It.-Libya (Oct. 23, 2008), 
https://www.repubblica.it/2008/05/sezioni/esteri/libia-italia/testo-accordo/tes
to-accordo.html [https://perma.cc/ME3F-DD26]. 
 129 See, e.g., Lorenzo Tondo, Human Trafficker Was at Meeting in Italy to Discuss 
Libya Migration, GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/04/human-trafficker-at-meetin
g-italy-libya-migration-abd-al-rahman-milad [https://perma.cc/WQ4J-J2YU] 
(explaining the suspected involvement of traffickers in the Libyan coastguard).   
 130 See MEHMET ENES BEŞER & FATIMAH ELFEITORI, LIBYA DETENTION CENTRES: A 
STATE OF IMPUNITY 6 (2018) (describing human rights violations and conditions in 
Libyan detention centers). 
 131 Id. at 2; see also Alessio Perrone, Italy: Navy, Coastguard Officials Charged in 
Migrant Deaths, AL JAZEERA (Sep. 16, 2019), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/9/16/italy-navy-coastguard-officials-ch
arged-in-migrant-deaths [https://perma.cc/JL6J-TTYR] (highlighting the death of 
thousands of migrants trying to reach Italy by sea). 
 132 ICC: Prosecutor to Open an Investigation in Libya, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 3, 
2011), https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/03/icc-prosecutor-open-
investigation-libya# [https://perma.cc/26M5-HCM6]. 
 133 Fatou Bensouda, ICC Prosecutor, Statement to the United Nations Security 
Council on the Situation in Libya, ¶ 25 (May 9, 2017), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=170509-otp-stat-lib [https://perma.cc/9DSE-
9TBC]; see also FOURTEENTH REPORT OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PURSUANT TO UNSCR 
1970 (2011) (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-unsc-lib-11-
2017-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CEX-TVU3] (assessing the situation in Libya 
and whether actions taken there amount to crimes against humanity).  
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Libya as a “marketplace for the trafficking of human beings”134  and 
said that “thousands of vulnerable migrants, including women and 
children, are being held in detention centers across Libya in often 
inhumane condition.”135  Bensouda, in word but so-far not in deed, 
joined the anti-impunity push to defend migrants and refugees.  She 
concluded a later address to the UN Security Council with the 
emphatic observation that if the ICC does not pursue its mandate in 
Libya, “impunity will reign . . . .  This, we cannot allow.”136  As the 
unspeakable violence against migrants in Libya was widely 
reported in global news media, it also became clear that European 
actors were complicit in aiding Libyan forces.  This could potentially 
implicate European actors in crimes.137 
Comparable to the role criminologists played in the Australian 
context, two social scientists contributed significantly to the new 
discourse in the Mediterranean.  Anthropologist Maurizio Albahari 
made a relevant contribution with his Crimes of Peace in 2015.138  
Documenting drownings and border violence, he described 
“methodical negligence, ill-conceived policies, and well-oiled 
criminal networks.” 139   Drawing ambiguous relations with 
categories of criminal law, Albahari explains that “[r]ather than 
unveiling guilt, investigating crimes of peace deals with explicating 
events, situations, mechanisms, and networks of correlations—
possibly conveying legal and political responsibilities.” 140  
Furthermore, “[c]rimes of peace do not need intentionality:  they 
may bank on the variable interest of unequally distributed 
‘tragedies.’”141   Albahari’s ambivalence on issues of mens rea—or 
indeed on the question of agency versus structure—illustrates the 
broader predicament of extending anti-impunity from 
 
 134 Bensouda, supra note 133, ¶ 27.  
 135 Id. ¶ 26.   
 136 Fatou Bensouda, ICC Prosecutor, Statement to the United Nations Security 
Council on the Situation in Libya, para. 56 (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp_lib_unsc [https://perma.cc/9E6W-8U5J].  
 137  Itamar Mann, Violeta Moreno-Lax & Omer Shatz, Time to Investigate 
European Agents for Crimes Against Migrants in Libya, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 29, 2018), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/time-to-investigate-european-agents-for-crimes-against
-migrants-in-libya/#more-16057 [https://perma.cc/Y3P2-5FP2] (supporting and 
urging investigation of Europe’s involvement in migrant abuse). 
 138 MAURIZIO ALBAHARI, CRIMES OF PEACE: MEDITERRANEAN MIGRATIONS AT THE 
WORLD’S DEADLIEST BORDER 22 (2015). 
 139 Id.  
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
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authoritarianism and war to migration.  His intervention is therefore 
comparable to the work of Penny Green and Mike Grewcock in the 
Australian context examined above.142  In both cases, the criminal 
law framing articulated by social scientists is not intended as a 
formal legal argument and is more of a metaphor invoked for 
primarily expressive purposes.   
In their ground-breaking work, interdisciplinary researchers 
Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani of “Forensic Oceanography” 
(“FO”) investigated European and Italian failures to rescue asylum 
seekers and migrants in the central Mediterranean.143  In a series of 
reports published from 2014-18, FO constantly alluded to legal 
categories.144  Through their work, patterns of state responsibility for 
actions and omissions that violated migrant rights became visible.145  
Alongside state responsibility, their allusions to the law of the sea’s 
duty of rescue, and sometimes to criminal law, seemed to expose 
aspects of individual responsibility as well.  When a vessel avoids 
performing a rescue, the arrow of accountability is split between its 
captain and its flag state. 146   The question of where should 
accountability stop raises interesting philosophical questions but is 
also a matter of strategy.  The underlying legal questions often 
require considering the overlap and disjuncture between  these 
different areas of law, including human rights law, criminal law, 
and the law of the sea.147  Whether on the legal or “merely” the moral 
levels, what they exposed appeared to some of us as an atrocity of 
historic dimensions. 
Against a backdrop of tragic events in the central Mediterranean, 
an Italian prosecutor was the first to initiate an actual criminal 
 
 142  Green & Grewcock, supra note 64.  
 143  See About the Project, VISIBLE, https://www.visibleproject.org
/blog/project/forensic-oceanography-various-locations-in-europe-and-northern-
africa/ [https://perma.cc/97N8-8J79] (last visited Feb. 2, 2021) (describing Forensic 
Oceanography, a project investigating the militarized border regime in the 
Mediterranean Sea).    
 144 Itamar Mann, Killing by Omission, EJIL:TALK! (Apr. 20, 2016), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/killing-by-omission/ [https://perma.cc/88MK-6HES]. 
 145 See, e.g., Charles Heller & Lorenzo Pezzani, Ebbing and Flowing: The EU’s 
Shifting Practices of (Non-) Assistance and Bordering in a Time of Crisis, NEAR FUTURES 
ONLINE, http://nearfuturesonline.org/ebbing-and-flowing-the-eus-shifting-
practices-of-non-assistance-and-bordering-in-a-time-of-crisis/ 
[https://perma.cc/GYA3-47C3] (using Forensic Oceanography research to better 
understand migrant abuse).   
 146 See Mann, supra note 144.  
 147 It should be disclosed that I often had the fortune of following their work 
closely and the privilege of serving as their legal advisor.   
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/3
2021] Border Violence as Crime 703 
investigation against a violator of migrant rights.  His target was 
then Italian Minister of Interior, Matteo Salvini.  Luigi Patronaggio 
of Catania, Sicily, acted in August 2018 on the premise that the 
Minister’s refusal to allow 177 rescued migrants to debark from a 
Coastguard vessel amounted to “kidnapping.”148  The investigation 
concluded with a decision to prosecute the far-right Salvini for the 
crime.149  However, under Italian immunity rules, such prosecution 
must be voted upon in the parliament.150  In February 2019, Salvini 
avoided facing a trial thanks to an online vote.151  Within the short 
history of anti-impunity rhetoric on behalf of migrants, the mere 
launching of an investigation was a rare and remarkable occasion.  
Often, we have merely seen calls for prosecution or investigation, 
without any real response by prosecuting authorities.  At best, 
activists put together people’s tribunals, as was the case, for 
example, in Stockholm and Barcelona.152  Here, anti-impunity comes 
from a state official.  An elected branch of government halted the 
move of a member of its bureaucracy and thus refused the criminal 
law framing.  The instance may be perceived as feeding into a 
narrative of collaboration between a bureaucratic class of civil 
servants and human rights lawyer-activists against elected officials 
and popular will.  Such perceptions should today be on the minds 
of lawyer activists and demand our urgent consideration. 
In June 2019, lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco authored an 
Article 15 communication equating the entire European and Italian 
policy in the central Mediterranean during 2014-19 to multiple 
 
 148 See Lorenzo Tondo, Salvini Defiant over Investigation into Illegal Detention of 
Migrants, GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/22/illegal-detention-italian-
ministers-bar-on-migrant-ship-probed [https://perma.cc/9RMV-4GF6] 
(describing Salvini’s attitude towards the investigation into his refusal to allow 177 
migrants to leave a coastguard vessel in Catania); Davide Vampa, Matteo Salvini 
Just Avoided Facing a Kidnap Trial – Thanks to an Online Vote, CONVERSATION (Feb. 20, 
2019), https://theconversation.com/matteo-salvini-just-avoided-facing-a-kidnap-
trial-thanks-to-an-online-vote-111979 [https://perma.cc/9RMV-4GF6].   
 149 Vampa, supra note 148.   
 150 Id.  
 151 Id. 
 152  See generally Andrew Byrnes & Gabrielle Simm, International Peoples’ 
Tribunals: Their Nature, Practice and Significance, in PEOPLES’ TRIBUNALS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (Andrew Byrnes & Gabrielle Simm, eds. 2018) (analyzing 
the history of modern international peoples’ tribunals).   
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
704 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:3 
international crimes.153  Relying primarily on FO’s work for their 
factual account, the submission argues for the investigation of 
European actors for a variety of crimes against humanity, including:  
murder (Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute); enslavement (Article 
7(1)(c)); rape (Article 7(1)(g)); deportation (Article 7(1)(d)); unlawful 
imprisonment (Article 7(1)(e)) torture (Article 7(1)(f)); persecution 
(Article 7(1)(h)) and other inhumane acts (Article 7(1)(k)). 154   In 
interviews, the two suggested possible defendants may not be 
limited to someone like EU representative Federica Mogherini, 
whose name comes up in the relevant evidence.155  They direct their 
accusations towards Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel, as 
well.156 
The communication applies international criminal law to alleged 
systematic omissions to act upon rescue duties at sea.157  Beyond its 
legal analysis, the communication made an enormous bang in 
international media, with leading newspapers across many 
countries giving it central coverage. 158   Multiple European 
parliaments and universities hosted events discussing the topic.  
 
 153 Omer Shatz & Juan Branco, Communication to the Office of Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court Pursuant to the Article 15 of the Rome Statute, EU 
Migration Policies in Central Mediterranean and Libya (2014-2019), at 8 (June 3, 2019), 
https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2019/jun/eu-icc-case-E
U-Migration-Policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/VSF3-XUC6].   
 154 Id. ¶¶ 163, 167, 173, 177, 179, 182, 185, 188.   
 155  Id. ¶ 386; Von Fabian Hillebrand, Strafrechtlich eine einfache 




 156  See also Owen Bowcott, ICC Submission Calls for Prosecution of EU over 
Migrant Deaths, GUARDIAN (June 3, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/jun/03/icc-submission-calls-for-prose
cution-of-eu-over-migrant-deaths [https://perma.cc/DUB4-DAEE] (describing 
the submission to the ICC accusing various European leaders of migrant abuse).    
 157 Shatz & Branco, supra note 153, ¶¶ 6-12.   
 158 See Bowcott, supra note 156; Emma Sofia Dedorson, Meet the Lawyer Taking 
the EU Migration Policy to the ICC, EUOBSERVER (June 14, 2019), 
https://euobserver.com/news/145162 [https://perma.cc/3MGP-M556] 
(interviewing Branco, one of the lawyers who wants to see European Union officials 
and member states prosecuted at the ICC for abusive migration policies); Kerstin 
Carlson, Migration: Time For the ICC to Put European Leaders on Trial, AFR. REP. (July 
26, 2019), https://www.theafricareport.com/15694/migration-time-for-the-icc-
put-european-leaders-on-trial/ [https://perma.cc/N72M-M6HD] (describing the 
decision the ICC faces after two lawyers filed a complaint naming European 
member states’ migration policies in the Mediterranean as crimes against 
humanity).   
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This attention reflects how captivating the anti-impunity narrative 
about the central Mediterranean has become for popular audiences 
globally.  Based on its record thus far, it remains hard to believe that 
the Office of the Prosecutor will do anything about this 
communication.  And yet, the public reception seems to prove that 
the criminal law framing has been successful in capturing the 
imaginations of many.   
iii. The United States 
Just like in the Australian and European cases, the American 
roots of the new anti-impunity are also found two decades back.  
Here, however, they are different.  Rather than anything directly 
related to the Rome Statute coming into force, they grew out of the 
aftermath of the terror attacks of September 11, 2001.  Responding 
to the attacks, the United States reorganized its border enforcement.  
Through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress consolidated 
all border patrol agencies into the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”).159  In March 2003, the U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (“CBP”) and the U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) agencies were established, both under the 
umbrella of DHS. 160   In hindsight, we now know that this 
reorganization entrenched and consolidated border violence, as well 
as the lack of accountability for it.161 
As emphasized above, the anti-impunity discourse first emerged 
in the context of war and authoritarianism.  The recreation of the 
U.S. border enforcement system, and particularly the ascendance of 
CBP and ICE, quickly led to the militarization of U.S. borders.  The 
establishment of a quasi-military environment on the U.S.-Mexican 
border prepared the ground for an anti-impunity discourse on 
migration.  Indeed, during the first decade of the twenty-first 
 
 159  Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).  
 160  CBP Through the Years, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (May 5, 
2021), https://www.cbp.gov/ [https://perma.cc/8A9Y-GDBA]; History of ICE, 
U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF’T (Jan. 1, 2021), https://www.ice.gov/history 
[https://perma.cc/PW4Z-HTQ5]. 
 161 This is, of course, not to say that border violence is an entirely new or 
unprecedented phenomenon.  For a look at previous decades, see generally Jorge 
A. Vargas, U.S. Border Patrol Abuses, Undocumented Mexican Workers, and 
International Human Rights, 2 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 1 (2001) (detailing the history of 
U.S. border violence against Mexican migratory workers).   
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century, the environment on the U.S.-Mexican border became both 
more war-like and more authoritarian:   
 
[I]t has become entirely normal to look up into the Arizona 
sky and to see Blackhawk helicopters and fixed-wing jets 
flying by . . . [and to] hear Predator B drones buzzing . . .  
[that] are equipped with the same kind of ‘man-hunting’ 
[radar] that flew over the Dashti Margo desert region in 
Afghanistan.162 
 
Just like in the burgeoning field of national security law, a 
militarized environment becomes intertwined with criminal law.  In 
a foundational articulation of this development, in 2006, legal 
scholar Juliet Stumpf introduced the study of “crimmigration.”163   
Crimmigration refers to the intense conversion between 
immigration enforcement and criminal law during the period, and 
indeed ever since.164  As Stumpf explained, the two become only 
“nominally separate.”165 
Stumpf’s intervention, which has also become influential in the 
Australian and European contexts I have described above, makes 
what is now likely a familiar claim:  criminal law has become a major 
administrative avenue through which the border is being enforced 
and managed.  As criminal law became a central category for 
thinking about migration, anti-impunity became a natural step to 
take.  The European developments I have described above in the 
struggle against smuggling have a direct American parallel, 
embodied in efforts to criminalize trafficking worldwide (and to 
expand the category).  This push to criminal law began during the 
George W. Bush administration and continued during the Obama 
administration.  Like in the Australian and the European contexts, 
part of its vocabulary included analogies to slavery. 166   Anti-
 
 162  Brief of Amici Curiae Former Officials of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection Agency in Support of Petitioners at 6, Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S.Ct. 735 
(2020) (N. 17-1678) (quoting Todd Miller, War on the Border, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/opinion/sunday/war-on-the-
border.html [https://perma.cc/BW9A-4G2Z]).  On the notion of “manhunting,” 
see GRÉGOIRE CHAMAYOU, A THEORY OF THE DRONE 30-36 (Janet Lloyd trans., 2015).   
 163 Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign 
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 368 (2006).   Stumpf is widely credited for the term, 
even though she was not the first to invoke it.   
 164 Id. at 381.  
 165 Id. at 376. 
 166 Chuang, supra note 10, at 623-24. 
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impunity appears in this context as an instrument of transnational 
governance.167  Importantly, we also see this move to criminal law 
in the language through which gang violence is addressed during 
this period.  Starting from the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, gang violence was identified as one of the major drivers of 
unauthorized migration.168  In the fields of development and human 
rights, the issue often came to be regarded as one of impunity.  Like 
in Europe, the term was also employed in the United States to 
address smuggling networks, which in both regional contexts 
established the material infrastructure for unauthorized entries.169 
Various actors pushed for greater criminal accountability in 
Mexico, as part of an agenda that presented itself as one of border 
security and human rights at one and the same time. 170   These 
included government actors, NGOs, and UN circles.  “[I]mpunity 
for human rights abuses against migrants is rampant,” wrote UN 
Special Rapporteur on Migrant Rights, Jorge Bustamante, in 2008.171  
“With the pervasiveness of corruption at all levels of government 
and the close relationship that many authorities have with gang 
networks, incidences of extortion, rape and assault of migrants 
continue.”172 
Rereading Stumpf in the context of the history of anti-impunity, 
the relationship between the national security emergency and the 
criminalization of migrants becomes abundantly clear.  The United 
States’ use of offshore detention facilities in Guantánamo and other 
“black sites” only started to become visible in the public discussion 
 
 167 Id. at 623. 
 168 Julia G. Young, The Situation at the U.S.-Mexico Border Can’t be ‘Solved’ 
Without Acknowledging its Origins, Time (Mar. 31, 2021), 
https://time.com/5951532/migration-factors/ [https://perma.cc/ZYR5-PBXT]. 
 169 On the notion of “infrastructure” and its application in this context, see 
generally Thomas Spijkerboer, The Global Mobility Infrastructure: Reconceptualizing 
the Externalisation of Migration Control, 20 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 452 (2018).  
 170 See, e.g., U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L. DEV., CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO GANG 
ASSESSMENT 10-11, 31-32 (2006), https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG834.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VA2C-5Z5X]; AMNESTY INT’L, INVISIBLE VICTIMS: MIGRANTS ON 
THE MOVE IN MEXICO (2010), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/36000/amr410142010eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3NSU-N2L5]. 
 171 Jorge Bustamante (Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants), 
Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, ¶ 65, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/11/7/Add.2 (Mar. 24, 2009). 
 172 Id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
708 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:3 
with high-profile cases in the Supreme Court.173  Imagining a future 
in which the criminalization of immigration continues, Stumpf takes 
a page from the national security playbook.  She envisions that it is 
the year 2017, and the United States has continued on its path of 
criminalizing migration.174  The result is that detention facilities are 
over-populated, and a network of offshore detention sites has been 
established in faraway places.175  For example, Israel is in the role 
that Nauru and Papua New Guinea play for Australia:  it provides 
the United States with offshore immigration detention services 
(specifically for Muslim detainees).176 
This allusion to national security cooperation is especially 
pertinent to the discussion of anti-impunity in the U.S. migration 
context.  Beyond the impunity of criminal gangs in Mexico, it starts 
to expose the sensibility I have focused on in my analyses of 
Australia and the European Union:  that border enforcement has 
evolved into a global plot to circumvent basic human rights rules, 
and create “legal black holes” (to use the term of the day for 
Guantánamo).177  In Stumpf’s imagined scenario, European States 
respond to the United States’ violation of fundamental human rights 
rules by imposing economic sanctions upon the United States.178  
True, this is not a tool of international criminal justice; arguably, 
however, it belongs to the same “family” of international legal tools, 
reserved for the worst of actors within the international 
community.179  That economic sanctions against the United States 
become imaginable in the mid-2000s reflects the dread some 
scholars start to feel when witnessing the emergence of carceral 
border policies.  Little could Stumpf know, at the time, that Europe 
would be developing its own version of such carceral policies. 
 
 173 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557 (2006). 
 174 See Stumpf, supra note 163, at 368-75. 
 175 Id. 
 176 See id. at 374-75. 
 177 Cf. Mann, supra note 47, at 347 (exploring “the trope of the ‘legal black hole’ 
to reveal questions of legal theory arising from contemporary migrant drownings”).  
 178 See Stumpf, supra note 163, at 375. 
 179 After all, Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, through which the UN Security 
Council imposes “coercive measures”, has been historically employed both to 
impose economic sanctions and to establish international criminal tribunals.  See 
DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII 
OF THE UN CHARTER: LEGAL LIMITS AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE 109, 116 (2001). 
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The description in the quote above, of the U.S.-Mexico border as 
a zone of man-hunting drones, is taken from an amicus brief.180  On 
August 9, 2019, CBP officials submitted it to the United States 
Supreme Court in Hernandez v. Mesa.181  Though the brief is recent, 
the underlying set of facts concern the killing of a 15-year-old 
Mexican teenager, Sergio Hernandez, back in 2010.182  The brief thus 
shed remarkable light on the development of border policies during 
the preceding decade and provides considerable insight on the 
American version of the new impunity.  Addressing the underlying 
facts, Roxana Altholz writes that CBP’s immunity for border killings 
stems from the fact that “all victims of border killings, regardless of 
geographic location of the harm, lack effective access to a 
remedy.”183 
For example, it is worth highlighting what might be referred to 
as, paraphrasing Chuang, “impunity creep.” 184   As the brief 
emphasizes, starting from the mid-2000s, CBP and ICE often hired 
personnel with deep connections to criminal organizations in 
Mexico, including cartel members. 185   The suggestion is that 
impunity, normalized on the southern side of the border, was thus 
invited into the U.S.’s border control agencies.  Furthermore, the 
former officials talk about a culture of protectionism within the 
agencies, which systematically thwarts efforts to impose 
disciplinary or criminal measures upon agents when appropriate.186  
These internal norms both reflect and further solidify patterns of 
violence that have been carried forward all the way to the present:  
“Between 2003 and May 2018 Border Patrol agents have killed at 
least 97 people, including 28 US citizens and six children.” 187  
 
 180  Brief of Amici Curiae Former Officials of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection Agency in Support of Petitioners, supra note 162. 




 182  Brief of Amici Curiae Former Officials of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection Agency in Support of Petitioners, supra note 162, at 32. 
 183 Roxanna Altholz, Elusive Justice: Legal Redress for Killings by U.S. Border 
Agents, 27 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 5 (2017). 
 184 See Chuang, supra note 10. 
 185  Brief of Amici Curiae Former Officials of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection Agency in Support of Petitioners, supra note 162, at 3. 
 186 Id. at 23-28. 
 187 Linda Green, COVID-19 and Legalized Criminality: Notes from the Arizona 
Borderlands, Part 2, 44 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 265, 265 (2020).  
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Hernandez was one of these people, and his family sued in order to 
obtain a civil remedy, but was barred from doing so under the 
doctrine of qualified immunity.  The case, which the Supreme Court 
has not yet decided as I write, seeks a finding that federal courts 
should recognize a damages claim if plaintiffs plausibly allege that 
a rogue federal law enforcement officer violated clearly established 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights for which there is no alternative 
legal remedy.  The amici start their submission with a clear 
statement: 
Sergio Hernández should not have been killed.  He was an 
unarmed teen who did not pose an imminent threat to the 
U.S. Border Patrol agent, Respondent Jesus Mesa, Jr., who 
shot him.  But because of conditions within the Border Patrol, 
similar incidents will likely continue to occur if agents 
cannot be held accountable in civil suits.188  
They then add:  “Without the possibility of civil liability, the 
unlikely prospect of discipline or criminal prosecution will not 
provide a meaningful deterrent to abuse at the border.” 189   The 
Hernandez case began “[a]fter President Obama’s Department of 
Justice declined to charge Mesa.”190  The brief illustrates, perhaps 
better than any other set of sources, how the extreme violence at the 
border and an utter lack of accountability for that violence 
developed during his administration.  Indeed, President Barack 
Obama increased migrant deportations to an unprecedented rate, 
while allowing others amnesty and paths to citizenship.191 
Yet, arguably, only as a response to President Donald Trump’s 
anti-immigrant policies, often couched in explicitly racist 
language, 192  did activists and politicians turn in earnest to a 
 
 188  Brief of Amici Curiae Former Officials of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection Agency in Support of Petitioners, supra note 162, at 3. 
 189 Id. at 4. 
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vocabulary of impunity.  During the Obama era we talked about the 
militarization of the border.193  During the Trump era, we have seen 
repeated deployments of actual troops along the border. 
Particularly central to the discourse of anti-impunity have been 
“child separation” policies, as well as punitive detention and 
deportation measures.194   A significant part of the anti-impunity 
discourse in the United States has focused on ICE.  In August 2018 
Zephyr Teachout, a progressive New York lawyer who ran for New 
York Attorney General, expressed her view in a campaign video 
that, “ICE was born in xenophobia in the time after 9/11, and has 
grown up to become a tool of fear and illegality.”195  She therefore 
promised that, “as Attorney General, I will continue to speak out 
against ICE, I will prosecute ICE for their criminal acts. . . .  The idea 
that we can call this law enforcement is a real offense to the idea of 
law itself.”196  The left-wing candidate and Fordham law professor 
was ultimately not elected, but nonetheless received the 
endorsement of the New York Times; a forerunner of endorsing 
migration anti-impunity in liberal media.197 
In the following months, several major American human rights 
organizations, as well as highly regarded legal commentators, 
advanced the argument that child separation policies at the border 
legally constituted torture.  Like in the Australian and European 
contexts, the centrality of torture to the criminal law argument 
stemmed from torture being both a human rights violation and a 
criminal offense.198  Beth Van Schaack, a law professor at Stanford 
and a former State Department official, authored a remarkable piece 
 
 193 See Joel Rose, President Obama Also Faced a ‘Crisis’ at the Southern Border, npr 
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on the torture of migrants in October 2018.199  Her analysis of the 
Trump administration’s engagement in torture relies both on the 
international legal definition and on domestic criminal law.200  She 
emphasizes a facet of the policy “acutely relevant to the U.S. 
definition of mental torture,” namely the unlawful drugging of 
children. 201   As Van Schaack points out, “the administration of 
mind-altering substances or procedures to disrupt the victim’s 
senses” has been specifically included in the U.S. Senate’s list of 
policies constituting mental torture.202  While she doesn’t spell it out, 
the outcome of her analysis is clear:  the perpetrators of torture 
against “[b]oth [p]arents and [c]hildren,” presumably U.S. border 
enforcement agents and political appointees—perhaps including the 
President—may in the future be targets of criminal prosecution.203  
 
 199  Beth Van Schaack, The Torture of Forcibly Separating Children from Their 
Parents, JUST SEC. (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/61138/torture-
forcibly-separating-children-parents/ [https://perma.cc/T3S6-A6E9]; Beth Van 
Schaack, JUST SEC., https://www.justsecurity.org/author/vanschaackbeth/ 
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 200 Van Schaack, supra note 199. 
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When it was revealed in December 2018 that migrants detained at 
the border are kept in freezing cells nicknamed ‘iceboxes’ (Las 
Hieleras), such concerns about torture were once again aggravated.204 
A legal clinic at New York University School of Law submitted 
another notable amici brief in February 2019, making torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatment arguments.205   This brief was 
submitted on behalf of a list of human rights groups and law 
professors.206  It reads:  “the forcible separation of minor children 
from the adult(s) with who they have a parental relationship and 
with whom they migrate, as in the case of [redacted for privacy] and 
her son, to deter immigration, constitutes torture under 
international law.” 207   Notably, child separation also raised the 
specter of enforced disappearances, which have long been central to 
anti-impunity rhetoric, especially in the context of struggles against 
authoritarianism.208 
Echoing some of the Australian and European analyses of 
migrant detention for “deterrence” purposes, the NYU clinic also 
alleged that “the U.S. government’s routine and non-exceptional 
detention of arriving asylum seekers like Mrs. De Faria Teixeira, 
without a meaningful individualized custody determination or 
independent review, and for an unlawful purpose, violates the 
prohibition on arbitrary detention under international law.”209  A 
similar analysis may apply to the force-feeding of hunger strikers in 
migrant detention facilities, revealed around the same time.210   
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Perhaps the fieriest moment unfolded on June 17, 2019, when 
Democratic Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez took to 
Instagram to protest the “fascist presidency” “running 
concentration camps.”211  Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez 
has become one of the most influential leaders of the party, and her 
words echoed far and wide.  In the coming days, then presidential 
candidate and former Attorney General of California, Kamala 
Harris, repeatedly claimed that the President’s treatment of 
migrants is “a crime against humanity.”212  One wonders whether 
Harris had intended, would she have been elected President, to 
instruct federal prosecutors to act accordingly.  For their own parts, 
celebrities including Cher, J.K. Rowling, Bette Midler, and many 
more tweeted in vociferous agreement.213  The looming specter of 
concentration camps, echoing World War II Nazi prisons and the 
United States internment of Japanese citizens, came with a veritable 
anti-impunity eruption.214 
To be sure, some found this eruption inappropriate or even 
intimidating.  The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, for 
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example, expressed criticism of such comparisons.215   As I write 
these words, however, activists deploying an anti-impunity rhetoric 
to defend migrants continue to display enormous energy.  On July 
27, 2019, protestors gathered on the D.C. National Mall, chanting 
“never again!”216  Similar events are unfolding in other American 
cities.217 
Perhaps because the United States is not a member of the Rome 
Statute, the turn to anti-impunity in the United States did not focus 
on international criminal law.  As it unfolded in the build-up to the 
November 2020 elections, it was characterized by a much more 
popular tone.  This is not to say international law did not have a role 
here.  A political imagination of mass atrocities and their historical 
memory, with an implicit allusion to law, has been just as important. 
b. A Global Trend 
The analysis above focuses on the fault lines between 
“developed” and “developing” countries.  And yet, the turn to the 
new anti-impunity in the context of migration is arguably global.  To 
name just two other apposite examples, the ICC prosecutor may 
seek to assert accountability for the violation of rights of Rohingya 
refugees fleeing Myanmar.218  On January 23, 2020, the International 
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Court of Justice arguably joined this effort as it issued “provisional 
measures” to prevent the crime of genocide against the Rohingya 
minority in Myanmar. 219   Separately, the option has also been 
discussed with regard to refugees from Syria.220 
Working within this general context, Agnes Callamard, Special 
Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Execution has identified something like a 
worldwide criminal scheme.  Callamard, thus, starts a recent report 
with a dramatic note, which I think strongly attests to the rise of 
migration anti-impunity.221  Her report “is concerned with what can 
only be described as a human rights and humanitarian crisis.  This 
crisis is characterized by mass casualties globally, a regime of 
impunity for its perpetrators and an overall tolerance for its 
fatalities.”222  If that is not enough, Callamard immediately explains 
that she is writing about “an international crime whose very banality 
in the eyes of so many makes its tragedy particularly grave and 
disturbing.”223 
IV. THE CRITIQUE OF ANTI-IMPUNITY 
The basic claims of the new anti-impunity have no doubt 
emerged as a central and wide-ranging response to border violence.  
It is therefore high time to assess it in the light of the critical literature 
on anti-impunity more generally.  The latter scholarship has largely 
proposed progressive and leftist alternatives to “the turn to criminal 
law,” and it is from this perspective that I would like to examine the 
trend.224 
The rise of the new anti-impunity can be explained by reference 
to worsening policies towards refugees and migrants.  According to 
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this view, criminal law came to be part of the rhetoric for defending 
refugees and migrants only when violations against them indeed 
became criminal.  Surely, there is something to that, but it can only 
be part of the story.  As many scholars have noted, border violence 
was abundant before the beginning of the 2015 “refugee crisis,” and, 
indeed, before the framing of the Rome Statute and the 9/11 
attacks.225  Further, the criminality of border violence is by no means 
evident, nor is it a matter of political consensus.  Even with copious 
evidence of horrid violence systematically directed against migrants 
and refugees, the criminality of border enforcement remains 
politically controversial.  Save, perhaps, for an Italian investigation 
against Salvini—truncated without an indictment—we have not 
seen prosecutions against political leaders, or any notable state 
backing for the new anti-impunity.226  In the United States context, 
even under the liberal Obama administration, it has proven difficult 
to impose any form of accountability on border enforcement agents 
who have killed unarmed persons.227  More often, the claims of the 
new anti-impunity remain the aspirations and dim threats of 
activists. 
The criminal law framing of border violence is the outcome of 
the political choices of activists and the interpretive work of lawyers.  
As such, they must be critically examined, not least by advocates 
who have made such efforts.  Might the vocabulary of mass atrocity 
be futile, perhaps even counter-productive?  What alternative 
agendas, progressive or other, may anti-impunity occlude?  In what 
remains of this Article, I raise four salient and closely related 
criticisms that have been marshalled against the turn to criminal law 
in human rights.  I respond to each in the more specific context of 
migration, to assess the critique’s merits, as well as its 
misjudgments. 
 
 225 The Berlin Wall is only one iconic example.  See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 101ST 
CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1989, at 1115–16 (Joint 
Comm. Print 1990) (discussing the German Democratic Republic). 
 226 See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text. 
 227 See Brian Bennet, Border Patrol Sees Little Reform on Agents’ Use of Force, LA 
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-border-abuse-
20150223-story.html [https://perma.cc/YM7D-NKAW] (explaining how a year 
after the Obama administration promised to crack down on Border Patrol, little 
reform efforts had been taken).  
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a. Justification 
Critics have long argued that claims grounded in jus cogens have 
the curious feature of begging the question228:  What does it mean to 
say that the torture or inhuman and degrading treatment of 
migrants is “absolutely prohibited”?  Martti Koskenniemi would 
perhaps respond that this is an instance of international legal 
kitsch.229  While international law surely condemns some policies, 
their framing as jus cogens may fail to do the legal and political work 
necessary to show why that is the case in any specific instance.  
“Peremptory norms” may thus consistently fail to convince one’s 
opponent. 
Voicing this concern, Koskenniemi adopts a “methodological 
formalism” intended to eliminate the value-laden invocation of jus 
cogens.230  A legal argument resting on state consent is better than 
one resting on “higher law.”  By appealing to the latter, we simply 
assume we are right and shrug away the need to make our case.  
Relatedly, jus cogens has too often been used to cast political 
opponents as villains.  By taking a moral high ground, they seem to 
disallow a plurality of opinions and perspectives on issues that are, 
one must admit, controversial.231 
In his contribution to Anti Impunity and the Human Rights Agenda, 
Samuel Moyn directs this critique towards the turn to criminal law 
in human rights. 232   For him, anti-impunity is a “deflection 
argument.”  Instead of explaining why criminalization would be 
effective for the prevention or deterrence of human rights abuses, 
the human rights movement has been satisfied with an obscure 
retributivism:  some crimes are so egregious, one simply must 
prosecute.233   Ending impunity, Moyn further remarks, advances 
“political trials.”234  These are “proceedings in which the organizer 
 
 228 Martti Koskenniemi raised this objection against peremptory norms a long 
time ago.  See Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and 
Renewal, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 113, 122 (2005). 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. at 123 
 231 See Samuel Moyn, The Embarrassment of Human Rights, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 
7 (2015) (disagreeing with Finnish jurist Martti Koskenniemi over the history of 
international law and human rights post-World War II). 
 232 See generally Moyn, supra note 9. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. at 72; see also Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 
MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 1, 33 (2002).  
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of the event has implicit or explicit aims beyond the ordinary 
workings of the criminal justice system.” 235   Astonishingly, says 
Moyn, these political ends are never properly articulated.  “The 
generalized slogan ‘ending impunity,’” he writes, “suggests that it 
is self-evidently and unfailingly a good thing to mount such political 
trials.”236  While prosecution may or may not be justified, Moyn is 
alarmed that often no real justification is even attempted:  “[I]ts 
validity goes without saying.”237 
For Moyn, the classical articulation of this unexplained 
retributivism is Hannah Arendt’s defense of the Eichmann trial.238  
He thus banks on her intellectual opponent, Judith Shklar, who 
sought to advance a justification for the Nuremberg trials in 
specifically consequentialist terms.239  The picture he paints, though 
not unfamiliar, is a bleak one:  trials for mass human rights 
violations, particularly at the ICC, have largely been ineffective 
under any consequentialist account.  Since violators have been tried 
and sentenced in the domestic sphere, that too is not an unmitigated 
social benefit:  incarceration is a social harm.  Ironically, “[t]he 
human rights movement emerged in opposition to 
imprisonment . . . .  [I]t is surprising that it is now so focused on 
throwing people in jail.” 240   As a general matter, migrant rights 
lawyers—who have often focused on fighting migrant 
criminalization and incarceration—surely share the latter view.241 
Arendt thought that there are certain crimes for which the 
perpetrator simply “must” be punished.242  Moyn questions how 
Arendt and other anti-impunity advocates arrive at this 
conclusion. 243   Yet the examples of migration anti-impunity 
described above shed a different light on Arendt’s retributivism.  
Rather than merely “deflecting” the need to argue, they convey a 
 
 235 Moyn, supra note 9, at 72. 
 236 Id. at 72. 
 237 Id. at 71. 
 238 Id. at 71-72; HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE 
BANALITY OF EVIL (1963).  
 239 Moyn, supra note 9, at 70.   
 240 Id. at 68  
 241 See, e.g., Cathryn Costello, Human Rights and the Elusive Universal Subject: 
Immigration Detention Under International Human Rights and EU Law, 19 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 257 (2012); Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration 
Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105 (2012). 
 242 ARENDT, supra note 238, at 234-252; Moyn, supra note 9, at 70.  
 243 Moyn, supra note 9, at 70-71. 
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specific kind of argumentative move.  The basic strategy of anti-
impunity arguments, as reflected in the migration context, amounts 
to an attempt to reverse the burden of proof.  When we call certain 
policies “torture,” or we liken them to concentration camps, or 
provide legal analysis according to which they amount to crimes 
against humanity, what we mean to say is:  “If you believe that this 
kind of suffering is justifiable, you should do the work to explain it”; 
a call for retribution is added for those who allow such human 
suffering to go on without explanation.  From this perspective, the 
political conversation in which we work to convince one another 
must be complemented with a more basic attention to the conditions 
in which conversation proceeds.  When certain boundaries on the 
permissiveness of border violence are set, one may have to reject 
such premises.  The other side needs to first explain how, for 
example, freezing migrants can be justifiable.244 
This might sound weird because the burden of proof in a 
criminal trial is assigned to the prosecution.  This of course remains 
unchanged; but when Moyn asks those seeking to criminalize gross 
human rights violations to justify their campaign,245 the appropriate 
response is that whoever carries out a “widespread or systematic”246 
attack upon migrants needs to do the justifying.  After all, the 
conditions in which the conversation on migration is carried out are 
themselves politically constructed, and they too can be challenged.  
The way to challenge them is to reject underlying assumptions that 
are supposed to render certain categories of violence towards 
migrants justifiable or even invisible.  Work from there. 
By proceeding in such a way, the new anti-impunity partakes in 
reimagining the contours of the polity.  It takes the view that law is 
not only about persuasion or justification within a predetermined 
context.  It is also about simply taking off the table certain kinds of 
violence against humans in order to transform the context for any 
debate to proceed.  The framing of migration cannot simply be 
accepted as part of the prerogative of states.  To dismiss such a 
reimagination as lacking justification is to assume that those who 
represent the extant situation can enjoy the privilege of asking others 
to justify their positions first.  A deflection, perhaps; but a principled 
as well as strategic one. 
 
 244 Alfaro, supra note 204.  
 245 Moyn, supra note 9, at 71. 
 246 This, once again, is the language of Article 7 of the Rome Statute.  Rome 
Statute, supra note 12, art. 7.  
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Furthermore, in making up our minds about the need to 
criminalize certain actions, their justifications, and their limitations, 
we cannot simply hide behind a call for “consequentialism.”  Such a 
call on this issue can only make sense against the background of 
political assumptions that go far beyond what consequentialism 
alone would allow.  A consequentialist analysis seeking to 
“optimize” the outcomes for humans the world over is nearly 
impossible.  Consequentialism will therefore often end up being 
formulated in terms of what is better for the citizens of a specific 
country.  In this reformulation, however, there is already an implicit 
preference for citizens over other human beings.247  This quickly 
becomes a justification for violence, potentially limitless violence.  It 
is hardly surprising that when it comes to migrants and refugees, a 
consequentialist argument has very often had “blood on their 
hands” (to return to Chetail’s formulation). 248   The “deterrence” 
paradigm of border enforcement treats migration in staunchly 
consequentialist terms.  The paradigm has taken hold nearly 
everywhere. 249   Consequentialism has also been invoked, for 
example, to argue against access to asylum requests.250  It has been 
recognized—sometimes even by courts—as a relevant factor for 
placing migrants behind bars and sending warning messages in that 
way. 251   What “deterrence” does, of course, is precisely 
consequentialist in allowing the violence toward some migrants to 
“deter” other would-be migrants.  The underlying unarticulated 
assumption—not in itself an outcome of consequentialism—is that 
impervious borders are desirable for the protection of a polity.  But 
it is not even clear that consequentialism, in and of itself, can justify a 
distinction between citizens and non-citizens at the border.  
Something else is at work. 
 
 247 See, e.g., Catherine Dauvergne, Citizenship with a Vengeance, 8 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 489, 495 (2007).  
 248 Chetail, supra note 78, at 917.  
 249 See Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & James C. Hathaway, Non-Refoulement 
in a World of Cooperative Deterrence, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 235 passim (2015) 
(providing a discussion on states’ responsibility for aiding migrants and the 
relationship to international migrant law).  
 250  See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, REPORT OF THE EXPERT PANEL ON ASYLUM 
SEEKERS 13 (2012); see generally Mann, supra note 62, at 380 (arguing that 
“[p]ragmatic policy solutions are operative in the continuous exposure of 
unauthorized migrants from developing countries to inhumane and degrading 
treatment and refoulment”).  
 251 See HCJ 8665/14 Tashuma Dasta v. The Knesset, 1, 20 (2015) (Isr.) (finding 
that deterrence can only be the purpose of immigrant detention if it is accompanied 
by another policy purpose).  
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To argue against U.S. government lawyers, who say that it is 
prudent to deny soap to migrant detainees,252 it is not enough to 
“rationally” engage (e.g., by discussing probable health risks).  It is 
unlikely that those who support such policies would be convinced 
by an appeal to statute or treaty law, where they would ignore a jus 
cogens argument.  Such individuals should simply not be answered 
on their own terms.  With respect to the spirit of compromise 
described above, the new anti-impunity is a self-conscious 
vocabulary of partisanship. 253   It is neither deflection nor proper 
justification set out to convey as well as to recruit political power.254 
Consider a relevant explanation to the concentration camp 
analogies, by historian Timothy Snyder.  Analogies to past atrocities 
are a central tenet of anti-impunity, generally.  In a short piece, 
Snyder explained:  “Analogizing is not some mysterious operation: 
It is how we think. . . .  ‘Never again’ is nothing other than an 
invocation of that process.”255  According to Snyder, we reach back 
to the past to illuminate the present:  “Once we understand 
something about the history of the Holocaust, we make our way 
forward again, seeing patterns we would have missed.  If we notice 
a dangerous one, we should act.”256  Giving up on analogies in favor 
of purely consequentialist reasoning may allow atrocities to return.  
 
 252  See Kate Cronin-Furman, The Treatment of Migrants Likely ‘Meets the 
Definition of a Mass Atrocity’, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/29/opinion/immigration-children-detentio
n.html [https://perma.cc/55DJ-XS2C]. 
 253 To use a term Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro coined, anti-impunity 
arguments are designed to “outcast” opponents.  Oona Hathaway & Scott J. 
Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252 
passim (2011).  
 254  Kate Cronin-Furman advanced an argument about the merits of such 
rhetoric.  Cronin-Furman, supra note 252.  For her, the criminal law vocabulary 
allows a focus on individuals, which will then impose on them a personal cost.  Id.  
Even if they are not ultimately prosecuted, the idea is that those involved in 
something like child separation will become ashamed within their social circles, and 
that their reputations will suffer.  Id.  While I am not entirely sure such a strategy is 
always warranted, it is a strategic choice, which may advance a political struggle 
(or backfire against it).  It therefore makes no sense to abandon or discard the tools 
of criminal law in the struggle against border violence.  Of course, advocates using 
it must be self-conscious and sensitive to the likely outcomes, and cognizant of both 
short-term and long-term effects.  For a conceptualization of such practices of 
“stigmatization” as a fundamental purpose of international criminal law, see 
Frédéric Mégret, Practices of Stigmatization, 76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 287, 288 (2013).  
 255  Timothy Snyder, It Can Happen Here, SLATE (July 12, 2019, 12:11 PM), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/07/holocaust-museum-aoc-detention-
centers-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/8TEH-5MEX]. 
 256 Id. 
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As Snyder puts it, “‘never again’ becomes its own opposite:  ‘It can’t 
happen here.’”257  Analogy, in other words, is a type of justification. 
Invoking a chilling illustration, Snyder explains how Nazis lured 
famished Jews to the killing with rolls and jam; for its own part, “ICE 
used doughnuts to lure hungry migrants to a place where they could 
be arrested, seizing mothers and leaving children behind.”258  The 
bottom line:  “While that is not exactly like using marmalade to lure 
Jews to the Umschlagplatz . . . .  The same kind of mind drew 
suffering people with sugar in 2018 as in 1942.”259  Such analogies 
drive anti-impunity, old and new.  If we decided to criminalize 
atrocity back then, perhaps we must act now as well; if trials were 
what we did back then, perhaps it is not foolish to push for trials 
now, as well.  That does not mean that the two historical conditions 
are the same.  Nor does it suggest that the United States is engaging 
in a policy similar to Nazi extermination.  But it does mean that the 
two instances fall within a category of violence that should be 
rejected altogether. 
The anti-impunity skeptic will still raise a legitimate objection.  
There is a world of difference, they will say, between using analogy 
as a call for political action (as Snyder does), and the retributivist 
conclusion that one “must punish.”  Can putting more people in 
prison ever be a progressive solution to anything?  Perhaps not a 
solution.  But as long as we have prisons, let them be filled with 
those who have committed the worst of crimes, instead of with 
migrants and refugees. 
b. Structural Violence 
For Engle, one of the main problems with criminal law is its 
focus on individuals. 260   Perhaps the major strand of critique 
directed at anti-impunity argues that this preference for individuals 
occludes larger systemic issues, which can then go unaddressed.  
Individualizing responsibility may serve to distract advocates from 
deeper social-economic hierarchies, structural discrimination on 
 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id.   
 259 Id. 
 260 Engle, supra note 4, at 1120–22.  
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racial or other grounds, or colonial subordination.261  If one focuses 
on individual heroic acts in the face of atrocity, they become more 
likely to forget that the actions or omissions of individuals are 
shaped by social conditions.  The underlying social conditions 
should therefore be at the center of transformative political 
programs.  Criminal law is ill-suited for the task. 
This critical tradition, too, emerged long before the human rights 
turn to criminal law.  While Moyn opposes Arendt in his critique of 
anti-impunity, 262  Engle relies on Arendt’s exact same work to 
explain this second point.263  She thus quotes Arendt’s observation, 
once again in the context of the Eichmann trial, that “we convince 
ourselves that if we remove the bad actors, we deal with evil.”264  
And indeed, Arendt’s 1963 book, Eichmann in Jerusalem, is one of the 
most influential analyses of structural violence in twentieth century 
social thought. 265   The book’s famous subtitle, referring to “the 
banality of evil,” has preoccupied generations of commentators.266  
It captures how the most atrocious violence can be structurally 
embedded in the social norms we live by.  Blaming a few defendants 
for the violence of an entire society may therefore be an exercise in 
self-deception.  Engle follows Arendt in her argument that in 
obscuring state responsibility, international criminal law misses the 
 
 261 See, e.g., Bonita Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence, Health, and International Law, 
22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 61, 77–86, 101–02 (2008) (observing that international law has 
transformed from understanding violence against women as primarily individual, 
to conceptualizing it as a way in which they are structurally subordinated to men).  
 262 See Moyn, supra note 9, at 70–72. 
 263 Engle, supra note 18, at 44. 
 264 Id.  
 265 See ARENDT, supra note 238. 
 266  Id.; see, e.g., Peter Burdon, Gabrielle Applyby, Rebecca LaForgia, Joe 
McIntyre & Ngaire Naffine, Reflecting on Hannah Arendt and Eichman in Jerusalem: A 
Report on the Banality of Evil, 35 ADEL. L. REV. 427, 429–32 (2014); Shoshana Felman, 
Theaters of Justice: Arendt in Jerusalem, the Eichmann Trial, and the Redefinition of Legal 
Meaning in the Wake of the Holocaust, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 465, 467–72 (2000); 
Stephan Landsman, The Eichmann Case and the Invention of the Witness-Driven 
Atrocity Trial, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 69, 70–72 (2012); cf. DAVID CESARANI, 
BECOMING EICHMANN: RETHINKING THE LIFE, CRIMES, AND TRIAL OF A ”DESK 
MURDERER” 4 (2006) (arguing that Arendt’s thesis about Eichmann’s ordinariness 
was to a large extent “predetermined and mythological”);  DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, 
THE EICHMANN TRIAL 165 (2011) (criticizing Arendt for discounting the evidence 
about Eichmann’s centrality in plotting the genocide); BETTINA STANGNETH, 
EICHMANN BEFORE JERUSALEM: THE UNEXAMINED LIFE OF A MASS MURDERER xxiii 
(2014) (according to which, in the many years of controversy surrounding Arendt’s 
book, it has “served to distract us from the matter at hand”).  
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ways in which bureaucracy functions.267  Does this critique of the 
criminal law apply to the new anti-impunity? 
For Engle, the structural violence that criminal law fails to 
address is intertwined with the violence of economic inequality.268  
She develops her critique focusing on attempts to address systemic 
human rights violations through criminal law.  She highlights a 
relationship between criminal law and economic policies that result 
in gross domestic inequalities:  “Given that neoliberalism depends 
upon and reinforces criminal law, in part to protect private property 
rights, the cards are stacked against any attempt to use criminal law 
to challenge neoliberalism.” 269   She thus suggests that tax law, 
corporate law, and private law generally, may be better suited than 
criminal law to counter inequality both on the domestic and on the 
global levels.270  Thus, for example, Engle observes that despite the 
ICC’s mandate to grant compensation to victims, criminal law is ill-
suited for such economic remedies:  “Given the selectivity of 
criminal prosecutions, the granting of these types of reparation is 
relatively arbitrary.” 271   Alongside a co-author, Helena Alviar 
García, Engle argues that, in the Colombian context, “the campaign 
against impunity might have displaced concern for the structural 
causes of violence and the need to address them deliberately and 
explicitly.”272 
In the context of armed conflict, both Engle and Moyn have 
accused anti-impunity of an agenda of “humanizing war,” which 
has allegedly displaced a broader program of ending war.273   A 
similar concern has often arisen in my mind in the migration context.  
Might focusing on the torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment of migrants end up simply advancing safer and “better” 
migrant detention facilities?  In both cases—war and migration—the 
concern is that identifying and insulating instances of gruesome 
violence helps normalize a structurally violent system.  It is 
 
 267 Engle, supra note 17, at 44.   
 268 Id. at 46.  
 269 Id. 
 270 Id.   
 271 Id.  
 272 Alviar García & Engle, supra note 34, at 233; see also Natalie Sedecca, The 
‘Turn’ to Criminal Justice in Human Rights Law: An Analysis in the Context of the 2016 
Colombian Peace Agreement, 19 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 315, 315-45 (2019) (discussing the 
turn to a focus on criminal prosecution and custodial sentencing in international 
law).  
 273 Engle, supra note 4, at 1101–02; Moyn, supra note 9, at 73–74. 
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imaginable that a program of “prosecuting ICE,” even if carried 
forward, will serve to penalize “bad apples”—low-level agents who 
may themselves be victims of an economic elite.274  Higher-ranking 
state officials, including Donald Trump -- or indeed Joe Biden -- 
would remain off the hook. 
Moving to another example from the European context, it is hard 
to question the value of work such as performing rescue at sea.275  In 
some ways, these are direct descendants of the sanctuary tradition 
invoked above.276  Their focus on saving lives is common to some of 
the efforts that laid the groundwork for criminalization, or those that 
made criminal allegations.  Think of Heller and Pezzani’s reporting 
on the organizational and personal intentions that lead to omissions 
of rescue;277 and of an argument such as one raised by Shatz and 
Branco, namely, that omissions of rescue constitute a crime against 
humanity.278  A legitimate question is whether liberal policymakers 
in Europe may not harness such arguments in a policy ultimately 
designed to save migrants and asylum seekers precisely in order to keep 
them off of European soil.279  This indeed may be a fair description of 
long-held aspirations among centrist policymakers, seeking to more 
effectively “externalize” European border controls.280  According to 
such a plan, people would be saved and immediately sent to a safe 
location outside Europe, where they may nevertheless not be able to 
realize a life worth living.  The sea would be territorialized:  a 
watery, porous sea border would be replaced by a much “harder” 
one, perhaps relying on the help of drones and other surveillance 
technologies.281  This may not be an advantage from the standpoints 
of those who want more open borders.282 
 
 274 See Itamar Mann, Hangman’s Perspective: Three Genres of Critique Following 
Eichmann, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 652 (Kevin Jon 
Heller et. al. eds., 2020).  
 275 See UN Special Rapporteur Attacks “International Regime of Impunity” Over 
Migrant Deaths, supra note 40. 
 276 See Falk, supra note 50.  
 277 See Heller & Pezzani, supra note 145. 
 278 See Shatz & Branco, supra note 153. 
 279 See Kalpouzos & Mann, supra note 123. 
 280 See supra note 94.  
 281  See Daniel Howden, Apostolis Fotiadis & Antony Loewenstein, Once 
Migrants on Mediterranean Were Saved by Naval Patrols.  Now They Have to Watch as 
Drones Fly Over, GUARDIAN (August 4, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/04/drones-replace-patrol-ship
s-mediterranean-fears-more-migrant-deaths-eu [https://perma.cc/BW47-JKG9]. 
 282 See Mann, supra note 51.  
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But such a critique of migration anti-impunity may miss some of 
its specificity.  In the migration context, the turn to criminal law was 
also an attempt to shed light on the role of for-profit corporations in 
border violence.283  This is reflected clearly, I believe, in the Article 
15 submission that GLAN and the Stanford clinic submitted to the 
ICC prosecutor, directed at the complicity of the Spanish company 
Ferrovial.284  We have also seen, in the Australian context, that the 
turn to criminal law came alongside a use of tort law in a class action 
alleging that such firms are liable for crimes against humanity.285  
These intersections of criminal law with tort law go beyond a simple 
retributivism and are self-consciously designed to achieve material 
results through criminal law alongside other legal disciplines.  In 
other words, criminal law is merely one aspect of a multi-pronged 
program that is, ideally, very cognizant of the need to address 
“structural” problems.  Ultimately, what is needed is a pluralist legal 
strategy in which different areas of law complement (rather than 
displace) each other.286 
The way in which torts claims can build on an allegation of 
crimes against humanity has been demonstrated most vividly in the 
Australian case of Kamasaee v Commonwealth.287  As Gabrielle Holly 
explains, allegations against the companies that facilitated detention 
in Manus and Nauru were framed in negligence.288  Yet they 
 
mirror the matters relied on in NGO reports alleging 
contraventions of IHR [International Human Rights] law and 
those relied on in the Communiqué [The Stanford/GLAN 
Article 15 Communication] to support the views of its authors 
that the Australian Government and its corporate contractors 
could be prosecuted for crimes against humanity.289 
 
 283 See Ioannis Kalpouzos, International Criminal Law and the Violence Against 
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In other words, the international criminal law allegations formed a 
basis for the tort claim and lent it some weight.  The Kamasaee case 
surely secured an economic remedy, which is what, for Engle, is 
missing from anti-impunity initiatives.  On June 7, 2017, the parties 
settled for a sum of 70 million Australian dollars (around 47 million 
U.S. dollars),290 97 percent of which had been disbursed to victims 
by April 2018.291  This was “the largest human rights class action 
settlement in Australian history.”292 
As Holly emphasizes, this economic remedy did not put an end 
to the structural issues the case sought to tackle.  The very fact the 
case was settled meant that underlying matters of Australian 
liability were not decided:  “[T]he settlement means that there is still 
no clarity regarding the legal limits on how Australia is entitled to 
conduct its offshore detention centres, and what its corporate 
contractors may do to facilitate its policy.”293  Similarly, the case did 
not remove “the veil of secrecy that remains draped over the 
offshore detention centres.”294  While I agree with Engle entirely that 
economic remedies are crucial in order to address structural 
violence, they do not suffice.  There is a certain residue of structural 
violence in eschewing accountability, and a massive lack of 
transparency, which tort litigation may be amenable to.  Countering 
these outcomes in a continued struggle may mean doubling down 
on the international human rights law and international criminal 
law strategies, not least because they involve non-Australian 
forums.  Australian courts, even while facilitating an economic 
remedy by way of settlement, have gone a long way to defend an 
accountability gap and executive interests, such as secrecy. 
Further, the interface between criminal law and private law is 
rooted in the intellectual sources of the new anti-impunity.  The turn 
to criminal law in the migration context reflects, at least in part, a 
concerted effort to redirect earlier anti-impunity campaigns precisely 
towards more structural issues.  Think, for example, of the relatively 
early conceptualizations of “state crime” in the Australian context.295  
The term, at least initially more conceivable in criminology than in 
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law, arguably invited the development of a doctrinal space between 
the international law of state responsibility and criminal law.  This 
was directed to the protection of the world’s poorer populations—
those who typically cross borders in an unauthorized way. 
The work Ioannis Kalpouzos and I did on “banal crimes against 
humanity” shared a similar agenda.296  Responding to the Arendtian 
framing that had also preoccupied Engle, we chose a different 
direction.  Rather than developing an argument against criminal 
law, we tried to develop a set of criminal law tools that would 
overcome a shortcoming of the discipline and capture structural 
violence. 297   Like the “state crime” paradigm, Albahari moves 
between notions borrowed from criminal law and an analysis of 
structural violence.298  As reflected both in the academic work and 
advocacy in all three regional contexts discussed above, the category 
of “deterrence” emerged ostensibly as a form of governance for 
large scale populations.  Recontextualizing it as amounting to 
criminal activity is perhaps the boldest and most important 
collective contribution of the new anti-impunity to a struggle against 
structural violence. 
On a higher level of generality, the new anti-impunity is aimed 
directly at global structural issues, primarily global redistribution 
and decolonization.299  No less important is the basic effort to simply 
terminate wrongful activity, which is as much a remedy of human 
rights law as it is a remedy of criminal law.  Considering the jus 
cogens of the new anti-impunity, one might better think of the project 
as one of abolishing certain forms of border violence, not necessarily 
imprisoning its perpetrators. 
While ambitious programs for global redistribution of wealth 
have largely failed, one avenue for such redistribution that has 
arguably been more successful is the bottom-up efforts of migrants.  
Moving and working across borders, citizens of impoverished 
countries have managed to send considerable remittances home.  
Often exposed to slave-like conditions in difficult jobs such as 
agriculture, they have nevertheless been able to positively influence 
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the GDPs of their countries.300  Rather than direct transfers of wealth, 
migrants, both authorized and unauthorized, have arguably been at 
the forefront of a struggle against global inequality. 
For some left-leaning critics, this contribution to reducing global 
inequality may be associated with a contribution to domestic 
inequality.301  According to such a position, a freer movement of 
labor, often alongside lifting trade barriers, has resulted in an 
increased vulnerability of workers more generally.  The latter 
proposition is probably the most important challenge to left-leaning 
advocates working for porous or open borders.  Yet we believe there 
is no necessary zero-sum game in which granting opportunities for 
workers from abroad means disempowering domestic labor.  The 
aim to criminalize border violence should come hand in glove with 
a concern for redistribution of wealth and particularly for labor at 
home.  Moving to de-colonization, Tendayi Achiume has provided 
perhaps the most compelling account.  For her, such a bottom-up 
movement of migrants also helps redefine formerly colonial 
societies, in a way that reflects their debts to former colonies.302 
Taking these background conditions into account, the work of 
advocates engaging in the new anti-impunity can be conceptualized 
in terms of increasing the costs of border enforcement.  Even if the 
campaign results in improved detention conditions, such 
improvement may end up being of use for global redistribution 
and/or decolonization “from below.”  The hope is that if one 
renders border violence more tolerable, this will indirectly facilitate 
a measure of freedom of movement. And freedom of movement 
may be the most effective and appropriate way of addressing certain 
kinds of global structural violence that have proven particularly 
intractable otherwise. 
 
 300  See, e.g., Muhammad Azam, The Role of Migrant Workers Remittances in 
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c. Law and Politics 
In a closely related point, Zinaida Miller observes that “anti-
impunity is a kind of anti-politics.”303  Miller’s sentiment may at first 
blush ring true about the new anti-impunity.  Think again of 
Patronaggio’s investigation against Salvini for “kidnapping.”304  As 
illustrated by the Italian Senate, if voters are not in line with anti-
impunity agendas, their representatives will quickly render futile 
any appeal to criminal law.305  Anti-impunity advocates hopeful of 
torture prosecutions against George W. Bush’s national security 
team saw a similar dynamic even after Barack Obama’s election.  
Obama had suggested his administration would consider such 
prosecutions, but once in office came nowhere near them—
presumably wary of their political unpopularity.306  Threatening to 
prosecute where it is politically unpopular is a risky thing to do.  It 
may be likened to pointing an unloaded gun at one’s enemy.  
Further, the rhetorical appeal of mass atrocity may invite a robust 
and destructive political backlash—something Obama may have 
sought to prevent, and that Salvini has embodied.  For 
consequentialists who seek to better defend human rights, a political 
backlash is surely another harm that should be forestalled.  
Seemingly apolitical appeals to criminal law may play in favor of 
popular leaders aiming to score points against the rule-of-law 
bureaucracy. 
Turning to a criminal law vocabulary may be perceived as a way 
of avoiding the more difficult conversation:  why, in the first place, 
are migrants and refugees presently exposed to such horrid 
conditions in so many parts of the world?  What are the pragmatic 
solutions that can be offered to help them?  While the enforcement 
of national borders in many parts of the world surely depends on 
horrible violence, it is unclear that we know how to do away with 
them.  In the face of intensified migration due to climate change,307 
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the concerns citizens have for their own security are ever more acute; 
translating them to worries about migration is sometimes 
understandable.  Taken together, these arguments seem to indicate 
that the new anti-impunity—from Andrew Wilkie to Kamala 
Harris—is deeply misguided.  At best, the new anti-impunity is a 
vanity project, helping citizens of rich countries alleviate their guilt.  
At worst, it scares the political center away from accepting policies 
that may help to welcome migrants and refugees. 
Whether anti-impunity is a kind of anti-politics in other areas, I 
don’t know.  Whatever the answer, it seems to me the evidence 
above illustrates beyond any doubt that during the last decade and 
a half, the new anti-impunity has developed as part of a wider 
progressive agenda.  The place where this is clearest is in the United 
States, where calls for prosecuting border control agents have been 
a component of an ascending popular movement, and its loudest 
proponents have been politicians on the left wing of the Democratic 
Party.  Far from simply mobilizing the courts against the elected 
government, people like Zephyr Teachout, Alexandria Ocasio-
Cortez, and others have made anti-impunity arguments as part of a 
strategy designed to win votes. 
 
d. (Re)Writing History 
A fourth critique Engle directs towards the turn to criminal law 
in human rights focuses on how the trend has resulted in trials being 
imagined as forums for writing history.308  This concern, which is 
also traceable back to Arendt,309 highlights the different kinds of 
burdens, mainly procedural and evidentiary, which prosecutorial 
and historical research must lift.  When a criminal trial is understood 
to generate a historical record, the latter is tainted by the 
peculiarities of criminal law.  Such a history may lose its critical role, 
and simply become subservient to political ends.310   If, as Moyn 
remarks, mass atrocity trials are almost invariably “political 
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trials”;311 and if—as has arguably often been the case at least since 
Nuremberg—such trials advance “victors’ justice”; then it seems to 
follow that the history produced by mass atrocity trials will not only 
be politically tainted, but also will be a history from the point of view 
of victors. 
Anti-impunity has often arisen in the context of societies in 
transition.  Criminal trials have thus been advanced as an 
instrument of transitional justice.  As such, they are supposed to 
help a society heal from a history of atrocity, restore relations 
between its factions, and begin anew.  The role of criminal trials in 
writing history is closely linked to this transition.  Generally, the 
court is expected to help narrate a history that the new society can 
accept as its own.  This may be accomplished through the creation 
of a documentary archive, the hearing of victims and witnesses, and 
ultimately by the writing of a judgement.  The court may further 
design punishments in a way that reflects the values a new social 
contract aims to espouse.  Criminal trials, in their transitional justice 
mode, have a constitutional role. 
Migration anti-impunity has hardly culminated in trials.  What, 
if any, can be its role in a project of transitional politics?  Might one 
be able to imagine migration anti-impunity as having such a quasi-
constitutional role?  A possible answer is provided by one aspect of 
migration anti-impunity I have not discussed thus far:  peoples’ 
tribunals.  Peoples’ tribunals aiming to assert a measure of 
accountability for the violation of migrant rights have often taken on 
the form of criminal prosecutions.312  As Dianne Otto has remarked, 
such tribunals amount to “[i]mpunity in a [d]ifferent [r]egister.”313 
These peoples’ tribunals are attempts to rewrite history, in a way 
that would help imagine an international society in which certain 
categories of border violence would cease to exist.  Imagine what a 
world without torture or inhuman and degrading treatment of 
migrants would look like.  Let’s assume we could still have national 
borders between states, if perhaps more porous ones.  How would 
they work? 
Thinking through such questions requires us to partake in 
drawing an alternative world history, in which the history of 
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migration is part of a larger history of political and economic 
liberation.  Shrugging away the needs of strangers and simply 
“letting them drown” becomes unconscionable.314  When borders 
can no longer inflict violence on persons, the result is likely a world 
of much greater movement across borders; and much greater 
cooperation between states to facilitate orderly movement, both on 
bilateral and multilateral levels.  But from our present perspective, 
it is hard to say much more. 
This is as far as one can get from a victor’s history, and we are 
still far from winning.  The history also does not fall into a naïve or 
apolitical humanitarianism.  The object is not only to protect 
migrants’ bodies, but to engage in a utopian exercise in which 
barring border violence is only a first step in a much larger project:  
a new constitutional identity that would buttress an entire 
transformation of societies and economies in ways that would 
render such violence unnecessary to begin with. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Calls to criminalize border violence, through domestic or 
international mechanisms, have appeared around the world.  This 
Article has juxtaposed such calls with a trend in human rights 
scholarship, namely the critique of anti-impunity discourse.  I dealt 
with critiques according to which “the turn to criminal law” in 
human rights has:  (1) lacked justification; (2) ignored structural 
violence; (3) inappropriately depoliticized human rights; and (4) 
misguidedly encouraged the appeal to criminal law as a forum for 
writing history.  I have done so relying on an account of the 
emergence of anti-impunity in the context of migrant struggles 
around the world, focusing on Australia, Europe, and the United 
States. 
The critical trend has revealed important limitations of criminal 
law orientations to human rights in war and under authoritarian 
government.  Yet its authors’ arguments are often overly broad 
when examined in the migration context.  The new anti-impunity 
has, to some extent, evolved precisely in order to respond to points 
such as those the critique has raised, from within the vocabulary of 
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criminal law.  This is crucial, because it is often possible to avoid the 
pitfalls of criminal law while not entirely doing away with the 
opportunities for advocacy that it offers. 
A possible objection to my approach is that I have narrowed the 
critique of the turn to criminal law and not treated all of its different 
angles.  This is to some extent true.  Karen Engle, Denis Davis, 
Zinaida Miller, and the authors they have brought together do not 
take into account the perspective of global migration law.315  This is 
understandable, as migration is arguably still a small part of the 
broader anti-impunity discussion.  But this is also not true about the 
entire universe of critical voices.  Janie Chuang, who also advanced 
a critique of the turn to criminal law, closely considered migration 
issues, focusing specifically on human trafficking.316 
Chuang favors a labor law perspective, and emphasizes the 
political ambiguousness of criminalization efforts, which has often 
been unhelpful.  Yet she interestingly takes a more nuanced 
position, which does give room for criminal law measures:  
Although criminal justice approaches have (rightly) received 
much criticism, crime-control concerns have elevated the 
issue of trafficking to one of international and national 
concern . . . when pursued in a victim-centered, rights-
protective manner, criminal justice interventions 
unquestionably offer much-needed accountability and 
restitution for egregious wrongs.317 
Following her cue, I have offered a criminal law approach to 
border violence that takes criticism on board and is part of a wider 
variety of legal and political strategies.  This Article thus aimed to 
contribute to a pluralist literature on transnational strategic human 
rights litigation.318   What I have called “the new anti-impunity” 
reflects a sustained attempt to respond through criminal law to 
structural violence directed by rich states against citizens of poor 
states and at the fault lines between rich and poor states.  This turn 
to criminal law in the protection of refugees and migrants is still 
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rather inchoate.  Advocates can and should continue to internalize 
the critique, adjusting their agenda accordingly and in real time, 
rather than ignoring it. 
In the United States context, the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision on Hernandez v. Mesa could have far-reaching implications 
on the level of impunity that the U.S. legal system tolerates.  As has 
been the case with earlier precedents, a U.S. Supreme Court decision 
on this issue would have transnational and global ripple effects.319 
If there is one critical point that I believe is important to take 
rather seriously, it is the critique of the ICC as the forum for the new 
anti-impunity.  The more specific critique directed against the ICC, 
rather than against the criminal law more generally, may justify a 
turn away from that forum.  The ICC has been sluggish and 
ineffective in many other areas, and at present, it is hard to imagine 
how it will become useful here.  I have emphasized an instance in 
which a submission we have made regarding the Australian 
situation has later been useful for a domestic class action.  That is a 
success of sorts in breaking the silos between criminal law and torts.  
However, without a change in how the ICC selects its cases, it is hard 
to imagine that such initiatives will be very helpful.  The work to 
push a criminal law orientation on the domestic sphere may be 
harder.  One practical insight that may be drawn from the critique 
of anti-impunity is that it may ultimately be more important to push 
criminal law on the domestic sphere than the international one. 
By way of conclusion, I would like to highlight a slight discord 
between the title of this Article and its body.  The former refers to 
impunity, a condition in which legal accountability for human rights 
violations is absent.  The latter mainly discusses anti-impunity, a 
legal and social movement, and a political critique that has been 
marshaled against it.  This slight discrepancy is intentional and 
signals the underlying normative motivation for writing.  Rather 
than examining the rhetoric of anti-impunity as disinterested social 
inquiry, the Article has attempted to consider that rhetoric in order 
to improve the instruments of a struggle for accountability. 
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